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PROMISE-INDUCED FALSE CONFESSIONS: 
LESSONS FROM PROMISES IN  
ANOTHER CONTEXT 
Abstract: People are generally skeptical that someone would falsely confess 
to a crime he or she did not commit. Nonetheless, a myriad of convicts exon-
erated by DNA and the rapidly emerging scientific literature on the subject 
calls into question this long-standing belief. Scholars in the field now recog-
nize that personal and situational risk factors, including promises of leniency, 
heighten the risk of a false confession. Promises of leniency have been shown 
to be particularly coercive in interrogations and to produce unusually persua-
sive testimony in the courtroom. Due to a failure to recognize the power be-
hind these promises, our justice system does not adequately safeguard crimi-
nal defendants who give promise-induced confessions. As such, federal appel-
late courts are in disarray over when a promise of leniency renders a confes-
sion inadmissible at trial. On the other hand, the power behind promises in the 
plea-bargaining context is better recognized by scholars and laypeople alike 
and our justice system consequently provides much greater safeguards to 
criminal defendants who plead guilty in response to a promise. This Note ar-
gues that jury instructions that help the jury better detect, understand, and 
weigh confession testimony can close the unwarranted gap between procedur-
al safeguards governing promise-induced admissions of guilt during plea dis-
cussions and interrogations. This Note also proposes a model instruction, 
which conveys the relevant scientific and legal principles in a way that will 
impact jurors’ verdicts in false confession cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
“They told me . . . ‘You just go ahead and cooperate, and we’ll let you 
go home.’ I thought I was going home, but . . . I’ve been here ever since 
then.”1 
Calvin Ollins (Calvin), a fourteen-year-old with mental limitations, 
was one of four black men wrongfully convicted of the 1986 rape and mur-
der of medical student Lori Roscetti in Chicago.2 Late one night, the men 
                                                                                                                           
 1 THE MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUVENILE JUS-
TICE, WHY CONFESS? CALVIN OLLINS (2006), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/9454Microsoft%20
PowerPoint%20-%20Interrogation%20of%20Juveniles.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXL5-NFZY] [here-
inafter MACARTHUR FOUND.] (quoting Calvin Ollins (Calvin) regarding his wrongful conviction 
and subsequent imprisonment). 
 2 Calvin Ollins, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (May 6, 2014), https://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3445 [https://perma.cc/7V4P-TMUK]. Calvin 
had an IQ “between sixty-five and seventy.” See Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, New Evidence 
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allegedly jumped into Roscetti’s car as she was driving home and took her 
to an isolated area where they robbed, raped, and beat her until she died.3 
After investigating for several weeks without success, the police eventually 
brought Larry Ollins, Calvin’s cousin, and Marcelus Bradford to the police 
station for questioning because they fit the racial description Roscetti pro-
vided, previously served jail time, and lived near the crime.4 Following an 
intense interrogation, Bradford confessed to the murder and implicated 
Omar Saunders as well as both of the Ollins cousins, Larry and Calvin.5 
After five hours of interrogation during which interrogators threatened Cal-
vin with violence and the death penalty, and promised to release him if he 
confessed, Calvin admitted his guilt.6 At trial, the primary evidence against 
Calvin was his confession, Bradford’s incentivized testimony, and a crime 
analyst’s testimony about test results taken from semen found on Roscetti’s 
vaginal swabs.7 Calvin told the jury that he had admitted his guilt only after 
                                                                                                                           
Stirs Doubt Over Murder Convictions; DNA, Recantations Suggest Four Inmates Innocent in ’86 
Case, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2001, at N1 (quoting defense witnesses and Calvin’s teachers). At trial, 
Calvin’s teachers testified that he was only reading at the second-grade level. Hugh Dellios, Youth 
Guilty in Assault, Murder of Med Student, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1988, at C1. 
 3 Calvin Ollins, supra note 2. According to the trial court’s findings of fact, at around 1:00 
a.m. on February 24, 1988, Roscetti was on her way home from Rush University Medical School 
with a classmate. People v. Ollins (Ollins I), 601 N.E.2d 922, 923–24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). After 
dropping off her classmate, Roscetti proceeded to drive to her own apartment, but was apprehend-
ed by four men when she stopped at a stop sign. Id. A black man jumped in front of her car, and 
three others got into her car. Id. The perpetrators held Roscetti in the back of her car, drove her to 
an isolated railway access road, and then took her out of the car and assaulted her. Id. A railroad 
security guard discovered her body later that night. Id. 
 4 See Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 979, 1022–24 (ex-
plaining the circumstances that led to Calvin’s arrest and confession). 
 5 See id. at 1022 (noting Marcellus Bradford confessed after being at the police station for 
over fifteen hours). According to Bradford’s confession, they committed the egregious acts against 
Roscetti to get bus money for Calvin to get home. Id. at 1023. 
 6 See Dellios, supra note 2 (reporting on the promise and threats that were made throughout 
Calvin’s 5-hour long interrogation). 
 7 White, supra note 4, at 1023–24; Possley & Mills, supra note 2. Marcellus Bradford pleaded 
guilty in 1988 and agreed to testify for the prosecution at the other three men’s trials in exchange 
for a reduced sentence. Possley & Mills, supra note 2. At Calvin’s trial, the analyst testified that 
the tests she ran on a vaginal swab from Roscetti confirmed that the semen found at the crime 
scene was from a “secretor,” meaning a person whose blood type could be determined from saliva 
and other body secretions, not just from their blood. Id. According to the Chicago police crime 
lab’s own tests, which were given to the police and prosecutors before trial, however, the four 
teens were all non-secretors. Id. The defense failed to highlight this at trial. Id. The analyst did 
admit at that trial the results of the test were “consistent with thirty-seven percent of the United 
States male population,” and the defense argued they lacked probative value on those grounds. 
Ollins I, 601 N.E.2d at 924. It is not uncommon for the defense to underutilize scientific evidence 
or fail to properly rebut it as they did in Calvin’s case because many defendants cannot afford to 
hire expert witnesses. See STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS: INDIGENT DEFENSE 1 (Feb. 1, 1996), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/id.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y85E-8XY3] (finding, in 1991, that about three-quarters of state 
prison inmates and half of federal prison inmates were indigent); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Ake 
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detectives promised him he would be released and allowed to go home if he 
confessed.8 Nonetheless, the jury convicted him of murder, aggravated sex-
ual assault, and aggravated kidnapping.9 After spending more than thirteen 
years in prison, Calvin was released when DNA tests in 2001 proved he 
could not have been the perpetrator.10 Despite this positive ending, Calvin’s 
conviction placed him behind bars for almost half of his life as punishment 
for a crime that he did not commit.11 Unfortunately, Calvin’s story is not 
unique because promises of leniency continue to elicit false confessions that 
end in grave miscarriages of justice.12 
A confession, like the one Calvin provided, is defined by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501 and criminal law scholars as an admission of guilt to a criminal act, or 
a self-incriminating statement.13 Confessions are typically accompanied by a 
                                                                                                                           
v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1305, 1312–13 (2004) (finding judges typically deny indigent defendants’ requests for ex-
pert witness and investigator fees). 
 8 See People v. Ollins (Ollins II), 606 N.E.2d 192, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that the 
trial court properly found Calvin’s statements voluntary despite his claim that he made them be-
cause the police promised him he could go home if he cooperated); Dellios, supra note 2 (report-
ing on the circumstances surrounding Calvin’s confession); MACARTHUR FOUND., supra note 1 
(reporting on Calvin’s belief that his confession would be rewarded with release). 
 9 Ollins II, 606 N.E.2d at 195. Calvin was sentenced to natural life for murder with concurrent 
sentences of thirty years for sexual assault and fifteen years for aggravated kidnapping. Id. 
 10 Calvin Ollins, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/calvin-ollins/ 
[https://perma.cc/PAT4-L4WE] [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT]. DNA tests on spermatozoa 
and hairs found on Roscetti’s body and in her car excluded all four men as the perpetrators. Id. 
Following these DNA tests and Bradford’s recantation, all three convicted men were released. 
Meet the Exonerees, Wrongful Convictions of Youth: Larry Ollins, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, NW. 
PRITZKER SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictionsyouth/
exonerated/index.html?details=12 [https://perma.cc/R36L-E6DF]. 
 11 INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 10. 
 12 See DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocence
project.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/JN9E-ULGW] (aggregating 
statistics regarding false confession cases); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and 
Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 
382 (2007) (noting newfound skepticism evoked by DNA evidence toward police interviewing 
and interrogation processes). These DNA exonerations are telling, but do not account for the likely 
existence of many undiscovered wrongful convictions based on false confession testimony. See 
Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences and Implications, 37 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 332, 333 (2009) (highlighting unknown false confession statistics due to undis-
covered cases and difficulty proving a confession’s falsity with absolute certainty). 
 13 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(e) (2012) (providing a statutory definition of “confession”); Saul M 
Kassin et al., Police Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 3, 5 (2010) (defining confession). Black’s Law Dictionary provides a narrower definition 
of a confession by distinguishing between confessions and admissions. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin 
& Richard. A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 
891, 892 n.1 (2004) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary and discussing the difference between its 
definitions of confessions and admissions). Compare Admission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining an admission as “an acknowledgement of a fact or facts tending to prove 
guilt which falls short of an acknowledgement of all essential elements of the crime”), with Con-
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narrative of how and why the crime occurred.14 As one scholar remarked, and 
as many cases like Calvin’s demonstrate, “the introduction of a confession 
makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous.”15 Confessions are 
characterized as the “most damaging type of evidence,” a “prosecutor’s most 
potent weapon,” and so convincing that juries will commonly convict without 
any additional evidence of guilt.16 The evidentiary power of confessions 
comes in part from the widespread doubt that anyone would admit to a crime 
they did not commit.17 Yet, the fallibility of confessions continues to come to 
light as post-conviction DNA testing has now exonerated over 354 convicts, 
twenty-eight percent of whom falsely confessed.18 These exonerations only 
represent a fraction of false confession cases that were conducive to DNA 
                                                                                                                           
fession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a confession as a “statement admit-
ting or acknowledging all facts necessary for conviction of a crime”). 
 14 See Kassin et al., supra note 13, at 5 (detailing the different parts of a confession); Leo, 
supra note 12, at 333 (explaining elements of a confession). The post-admission narrative can 
transform a bare statement of “I did it” into a rich and compelling story of guilt. See Kassin et al., 
supra note 13, at 4 (explaining the post-admission narrative typically provides a basis for convic-
tion). It is not only the narrative’s rhetorical force that adds to the confession’s power; its content 
can have an even greater effect on the fact-finder. Leo, supra note 12, at 337. Many exonerees’ 
narratives included detailed and accurate information, which could not have been known by an 
innocent person but was likely disclosed during the interrogation process. See Brandon L. Garrett, 
The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2010) (reviewing false confes-
sion testimony of DNA exonerees and concluding innocent suspects are informed of public and 
nonpublic facts of the crime). 
 15 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed. 1972); Saul 
M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221, 221 (1997). 
 16 Kassin, supra note 15, at 221; Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of 
Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 469, 481 (1997). See generally ALFRED COHN & ROY UDOLF, THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM AND ITS PSYCHOLOGY (1979) (explaining that confession testimony, even when it is 
retracted, is the most damaging type of evidence). Innocent people are often convicted because of 
their false confessions, even when the rest of the case against them is weak and the confession itself 
is questionable. See Fernanda Santos, DNA Evidence Frees a Man Imprisoned for Half His Life, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/21/nyregion/21dna.html [https://perma.
cc/C2N9-BWZM] (reporting on circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Deskovic’s conviction and 
exoneration). In a 1998 study of sixty false confessions, seventy-three of the false confessors 
whose cases went to trial were wrongly convicted. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Con-
sequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of 
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 482 (1998). In a 2004 study of 
125 false confessions, eighty-one percent of the false confessors whose cases went to trial were 
wrongfully convicted. Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 960. 
 17 See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 835, 867 (2d ed. 1923) (remarking that false confessions 
almost never occur and any reports of false confessions have not been properly authenticated). 
 18 DNA Exonerations in the United States, supra note 12; see Kassin et al., supra note 12, at 
382 (noting the newfound interest in studying police interviewing and interrogation processes that 
accompanied DNA exonerations). 51% of the false confessors were twenty-one years old or 
younger at the time of arrest, 35% of the false confessors were eighteen years old or younger at 
the time of arrest, and 10% of the false confessors had mental health or mental capacity issues. 
DNA Exonerations in the United States, supra note 12.  
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testing (typically rapes and murders), but still expose a telling pattern of er-
ror.19 
Part I of this Note discusses the science behind why suspects falsely 
confess and why promises of leniency are particularly coercive in an inter-
rogation and produce persuasive testimony in the courtroom.20 It also ex-
plores the procedural constraints governing the admissibility of confession 
testimony and the disarray among federal appellate courts in applying them 
to confessions produced by promises of leniency.21 Part II of this Note ex-
plores the more commonly understood coercive effect of promises of leni-
ency in the context of plea bargaining and the corresponding heightened 
procedural safeguards protecting defendants who plead guilty.22 Part III of 
this Note argues that jury instructions can close the gap between procedural 
safeguards governing promise-induced admissions of guilt during plea dis-
cussions and interrogations.23 
I. PROMISE-INDUCED CONFESSIONS 
Following the reliance on post-conviction DNA testing in the 1990s, 
the empirically demonstrated risk factors shown to be associated with peo-
ple, like Calvin, who confess to crimes they did not commit, have become 
better researched and understood by experts in the field.24 Although the rea-
sons are complex and diverse, many false confessors tend to believe that 
admitting they committed the crime in question will be more beneficial than 
continuing to maintain their innocence.25 Section A of this Part explains the 
science behind false confession testimony.26 Section B of this Part focuses 
on the procedural constraints that govern confessions.27 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Leo, supra note 12, at 333 (highlighting the uncertainty of false confession statistics 
due to undiscovered cases and difficulty establishing a confession’s falsity with absolute certain-
ty). The ability to study the causes, patterns, and consequences of wrongful convictions involving 
false confessions was largely made possible by the advent of DNA testing, which established 
factual innocence to a certainty in numerous cases. Id. Due to this empirical limitation, this Note 
addresses cases involving serious charges. See id. 
 20 See infra notes 32–102 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 103–126 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 133–172 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 177–231 and accompanying text. 
 24 Kassin et al., supra note 12, at 382; Leo, supra note 12, at 333 (identifying possible errors 
during interrogation). 
 25 False Confessions or Admissions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/
causes/false-confessions-admissions/ [https://perma.cc/CR9M-NFZ3]. 
 26 See infra notes 32–102 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 103–126 and accompanying text. 
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A. False Confession Science 
There has been significant research on the science behind the causes 
and effects of false confessions.28 Section 1 presents the procedures that law 
enforcement officers use to obtain confessions.29 Sections 2 and 3 detail the 
situational and personal risk factors that heighten the chances of a false con-
fession and subsequent wrongful conviction.30 And finally, Section 4 clari-
fies why confessions that were produced by promises of leniency prove es-
pecially persuasive at trial.31 
1. Law Enforcement Interrogation Procedures 
Officers investigating crimes typically acquire confessions from sus-
pects through an often critiqued multi-step process.32 Each step is designed 
to elicit a confession from a guilty suspect, but creates a risk of mistakes 
that increase the possibility of a false confession and subsequent wrongful 
conviction.33 In the 1930s, a report authored by the National Commission 
on Law Observance and Enforcement as well as several Supreme Court de-
cisions shifted interrogation tactics away from physical coercion and to-
wards psychological deception.34 The Reid Technique, as set forth by the 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See, e.g., Leo, supra note 12, at 333. 
 29 See infra notes 32–49 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 50–69 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 70–102 and accompanying text. All members of law enforcement, which 
can include police, interrogators, detectives, as well as other officials, can be referred to as “offic-
ers” for simplicity. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 266, 270, 291 (1996) (using “officers” to refer to interrogators and detectives). 
 32 See Richard A. Leo & Deborah Davis, From False Confession to Wrongful Conviction: 
Seven Psychological Processes, 38 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 9, 20 (2010) (addressing the flawed pro-
cesses used in interrogations that induce false confessions); see also Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. 
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 36 (2004) (scrutinizing the interrogation methods commonly employed by of-
ficers). 
 33 Leo, supra note 12, at 333. 
 34 See Mark Costanzo & Allison Redlich, Use of Physical and Psychological Force in 
Criminal and Military Interrogations, in POLICING AROUND THE WORLD: POLICE USE OF 
FORCE 43, 43–51 (Joseph B. Kuhns & Johannes Knuttsson eds., 2010) (commenting on interro-
gation techniques before the 1930s); Kassin et al., supra note 13, at 6 (noting the most common 
“third-degree” tactics); Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of 
Police Interrogation in America, 18 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 38 (1992) (commenting on the 
development of interrogation techniques). The most common third-degree tactics in the late 
nineteenth century were physical violence (e.g., beating, kicking, or mauling suspects), torture 
(e.g., simulating suffocation by holding a suspect’s head in water, putting lighted cigars or 
pokers against a suspect’s body), prolonged incommunicado confinement, deprivations of 
sleep, food, and other needs, and extreme sensory discomfort (e.g., forcing a suspect to stand 
for hours on end, shining a bright, blinding light on the suspect). Kassin et al., supra note 13, at 
6. The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (also known unofficially as 
the Wickersham Commission) was a committee established in 1932 by then U.S. President Her-
bert Hoover. James D. Calder, Between Brain and State: Herbert C. Hoover, George W. Wicker-
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leading manual on police interrogations, now advises officers to begin by 
making demeanor-based judgements in a pre-interrogation interview to de-
cide whether a suspect is being truthful.35 This step is intended to ensure 
that only guilty suspects who dishonestly maintain otherwise are further 
interrogated while innocents are released.36 As people are typically poor at 
detecting lies, this crucial determination is easily decided incorrectly.37 
Next, officers issue Miranda warnings to inform suspects of their con-
stitutional rights to silence and counsel.38 After Miranda warnings are is-
sued, officers employ a guilt-presumptive interrogation with coercive tech-
niques.39 The Reid Technique advises officers to apply pressure while sim-
ultaneously insinuating that there are benefits to confessing.40 By supposed-
ly successfully determining guilt in the pre-interrogation interview, officers 
                                                                                                                           
sham, and the Commission That Grounded Social Scientific Investigations of American Crime and 
Justice, 1929–1931 and Beyond, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2013). 
 35 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
GO WRONG 22 (2011). The Reid Technique manual was originally authored by Fred Inbau and 
John Reid in 1962 and is now in its fifth edition. See generally FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (2011). The Reid Technique employs strategies designed to 
overcome the resistance of suspects presumed guilty by isolating the suspect, and then subjecting 
him or her to a nine-step process full of positive and negative reinforcement. Saul M. Kassin, 
False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM 
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. 112, 113–14 (2014). 
 36 See Deborah Davis & William C. Follette, Rethinking Probative Value of Evidence: Best 
Rates, Intuitive Profiling and the Postdiction of Behavior, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 133–58 (2002) 
(explaining the probative value of intuitively profiling suspects); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra 
note 32, at 36 (scrutinizing commonplace interrogation methods). Some scholars in the field refer 
to officers’ erroneous decision that an innocent person is guilty as the “misclassification error.” 
Leo, supra note 12, at 333–34. 
 37 Leo, supra note 12, at 334. In one study, police were not only less accurate than laypeople 
at judging whether confessions were true or false, they were also biased toward perceiving confes-
sions as true confessions and overconfident despite their inaccuracy. Saul M. Kassin et al., “I’d 
Know a False Confession If I Saw One”: A Comparative Study of College Students and Police 
Investigators, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 221–22 (2005). Moreover, training does not meaning-
fully improve performance compared with naïve control groups. Id. A wide variety of studies 
demonstrate that a person’s ability to detect a lie does not depend on whether the speaker’s moti-
vation to evade detection was high or low, whether the truths and lies were accompanied by high 
or low levels of emotion, or whether they were told in a monologue, a social interaction, or a face-
to-face interview. Maria Hartwig & Charles F. Bond, Jr., Lie Detection from Multiple Cues: A 
Meta-Analysis, 28 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 661, 661–76 (2014). 
 38 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (holding that 
law enforcement officials must advise a suspect interrogated in custody of his or her rights to 
remain silent and to obtain an attorney based on a reading of the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination). 
 39 Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 42. Although some amount of pressure is typical, 
scholars in the field refer to officers’ excessive use of manipulation as the “coercion error.” Leo, 
supra note 12, at 334–35. 
 40 See generally INBAU ET AL., supra note 35; see also GARRETT, supra note 35, at 22 (ex-
plaining the Reid Technique and its nine stages); Kassin, supra note 35, at 113–14 (explaining the 
Reid Technique and its coercive nature). 
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theoretically avoid interrogating innocent suspects entirely.41 Even if innocent 
suspects were subjected to interrogation, the authors of these coercive meth-
ods claim they could not induce an innocent suspect to falsely confess.42  
A suspect’s encouraged confession is often contaminated by a shaping 
of their post-admission narrative.43 Although the Reid Technique and other 
police training emphasize avoidance of disclosing key facts in order to 
properly test a suspect’s knowledge, many false confessors have volun-
teered information relating to the crime that only the perpetrator or officers 
could have known first-hand.44 For example, during seventeen-year-old Jef-
frey Deskovic’s interrogation for the rape and murder of his classmate, he 
drew an accurate and detailed diagram that depicted the three different 
crime scenes, which were unknown to the public.45 He also described how 
he delivered a blow to the victim’s temple, tore her clothes, and suffocated 
her.46 He was convicted in 1990, but exonerated by DNA evidence after 
serving 15 years in jail.47 Similarly, Calvin reported that detectives brought 
him a statement that had been written for him, which they made him con-
tinuously repeat.48 According to Calvin, “[t]hey basically gave me their own 
idea, their own picture, of exactly what took place at the crime scene—
everything from point A to point B.”49 
2. Situational Risk Factors 
In addition to the overarching risks introduced by these sequential 
steps, the presence of more specific situational factors throughout their im-
plementation can also intensify the danger of a false confession.50 First, the 
use or threat of physical punishment, such as violence or deprivation of 
food or sleep, can contribute to the risk of an innocent suspect confessing.51 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of Interrogation-Induced False Confes-
sion, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 47, 52 (Stephen J. Morewitz & 
Mark L. Goldstein eds., 2014). See generally INBAU ET AL., supra note 35. 
 42 Davis & Leo, supra note 41, at 52. See generally INBAU ET AL., supra note 35. 
 43 Garrett, supra note 14, at 1053 (studying contaminated false confessions); Leo & Davis, 
supra note 32, at 32 (explaining how the post-admission narrative is shaped). 
 44 Garrett, supra note 14, at 1053; see GARRETT, supra note 35, at 20 (reporting that in nine-
ty-five percent (thirty-eight out of forty cases) of false confessions studied, suspects volunteered 
non-public details about the crime they could only have learned from law enforcement’s disclo-
sures). 
 45 Garrett, supra note 14, at 1055. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 1056. 
 48 Possley & Mills, supra note 2. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Leo & Davis, supra note 32, at 20 (explaining the stages of false confessions in the 
criminal justice system). 
 51 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 283 (1936) (focusing on a suspect’s physical dis-
comfort as the motivation behind his choice to confess); see, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
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Second, the anxiety associated with the custody and isolation itself is also a 
physical risk factor.52 
The mentally coercive methods used during verbal confrontation also 
magnify the likelihood that an innocent suspect will confess.53 Thus, the im-
plementation of psychological interrogation techniques believed to overcome 
suspects’ volition by causing them to believe they have no choice but to com-
ply with orders is a third situational risk factor.54 Officers can cause this effect 
by making inculpatory allegations, interrupting the suspect’s refutation, ignor-
ing objections, and citing either real or contrived evidence.55 Fourth, the men-
                                                                                                                           
279, 286 (1991) (concluding that a government threat that a prisoner was in danger from fellow 
inmates if he did not confess induced that prisoner’s confession); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 
U.S. 519, 520–21 (1968) (concluding that an officer’s denial of food and high blood pressure 
medicine induced a suspect’s confession); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (conclud-
ing that an officer’s threat of angry mob of thirty to forty people outside jailhouse that would har-
ass prisoner if he did not confess induced a prisoner’s confession); Malinski v. New York, 324 
U.S. 401, 405, 407 (1945) (concluding that an officer bringing a suspect to a hotel and stripping 
him down induced the suspect’s confession); United States v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202, 202, 204 
(6th Cir. 1985) (finding that a bank robbery suspect, who confessed after being bitten and dragged 
by a police dog, confessed so that officers would call the dog off); GARRETT, supra note 35, at 38 
(explaining that the threat or use of physical violence can induce a suspect to confess). 
 52 Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 53. During an interrogation, suspects are often 
removed from their familiar surroundings and questioned at a police station. See id. This practice 
can lead to anxiety in the suspect because it promotes feelings of uncertainty about the future, lack 
of control, lack of autonomy, leaves him or her without an ally in the room, and enables police to 
make claims that are difficult for the suspect to challenge. See Costanzo & Redlich, supra note 
34, at 43–51 (explaining the anxiety associated with being in custody); Gail Johnson, False 
Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interro-
gations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 731 (1997) (arguing that in some known false confession cases, 
police use anxiety produced by isolation to invoke the suspects’ worries about their family mem-
bers to induce confessions). Furthermore, such anxiety increases a suspect’s incentive to escape 
the interrogation over time. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 53 (citing Philip G. Zimbar-
do, The Psychology of Police Confessions, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 17, 17–20, 25–27 (1967)). Long 
periods of isolation are often accompanied by fatigue, which can increase a suspect’s vulnerability 
to influence and negatively affect his or her ability to make rational decisions. Id. Although police 
interrogations usually last two hours or less, one study reported the mean interrogation time in 
documented false confession cases was 16.3 hours with 34% of interrogations lasting six to twelve 
hours and 39% of interrogations lasting twelve to twenty-four hours. Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, 
at 948. 
 53 See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice 
and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 980, 1001–77, 1117 (1997) (explaining the rational 
decisionmaking process of suspects who falsely confess under psychological pressure). See gener-
ally Saul Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Prom-
ises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233 (1991) (studying impact of 
implied promises and threats on suspects’ decision to falsely confess and jurors’ verdicts). 
 54 Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 912–14 (referring to the process by which the interrogator 
exaggerates the strength of the evidence and the magnitude of the charges to limit a suspect’s 
perceived options as “maximization”); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1001–77, 1117 (explaining 
rational decisionmaking process of suspects who falsely confess under psychological pressure). 
 55 See Kassin, supra note 35, at 113–14 (explaining officers’ coercive methods used to convey 
their belief in suspects’ guilt and futility of suspect’s denial). 
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tally coercive introduction of consequences through promises and threats in-
creases the probability of inducing an innocent suspect’s confession.56 Ac-
cording to rational choice theory, the combination of these abuses, perceived 
as limited options and consequences, result in suspects’ deciding that it is 
more beneficial to confess than maintain innocence.57 This type of confession 
is referred to as a “coerced-compliant” confession.58 
Promises of leniency, such as an officer’s assurance that he will recom-
mend a lighter sentence, are particularly coercive in leading a suspect to be-
lieve the only way to reduce or escape punishment is to confess.59 Psycholog-
ical research indicates that suspects take promises seriously because they as-
sume their interrogator has superior knowledge and experience concerning 
the consequences of confessing.60 Furthermore, cognitive and linguistic re-
search has found that express and implied promises are equivalent in their 
coercive impact because people often recall information beyond what was 
blatantly said, and instead process information “between the lines.”61 These 
two findings, taken together, lead suspects to reasonably rely on their interro-
gators’ implicit or explicit assurances when they calculate whether confessing 
would be more beneficial than maintaining their innocence.62 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 917. In most false confession cases, interrogators com-
municate either explicitly or implicitly that the suspect will receive more lenient treatment if he or 
she confesses and harsher treatment if he or she does not. See Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: 
Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 
249, 250 (2008) (referring to the process by which an interrogator explicitly or implicitly offers 
leniency to downplay the seriousness of an offense as “minimization”). These promises of lenien-
cy can take the form of offers of outright release from custody, counseling instead of prison, or 
reduced charges, whereas promises of punishment include threats of longer prison statements, the 
death penalty, or harm to family members. Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 917. 
 57 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1001–77, 1117 (explaining that suspects become persuaded 
that resistance is either futile or not worth its costs). 
 58 Kassin, supra note 35, at 114 (defining “coerced-compliant” false confessions as an inno-
cent person knowingly confessing as an act of behavioral compliance). In contrast, a “coerced-
internalized” false confession occurs when an innocent suspect is exposed to deceptive claims 
about the evidence, becomes confused, questions his or her innocence, infers his or her own guilt, 
and sometimes even develops false memories in support of that inference. Id. 
 59 Kassin et al., supra note 13, at 29 (explaining effect of promises of leniency on suspects’ 
rational choices). 
 60 See Leo & Davis, supra note 32, at 35 (arguing suspects give serious weight to an interro-
gator’s arguments and implications regarding why confessions will result in greater leniency). 
 61 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 235, 248 (presenting a study on the impact of im-
plied promises on suspects’ decision to falsely confess and finding implied and explicit promises 
are equally coercive). 
 62 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1001–77, 1117 (explaining suspects’ rational decision-
making during interrogations). 
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3. Personal Risk Factors 
A suspect’s personal attributes also contribute to his or her vulnerabil-
ity in making a false confession.63 Due to psychological characteristics, 
some people are more likely than others to respond with compliance or sug-
gestibility when confronted with the aforementioned coercive interrogation 
methods.64 These psychological characteristics include mental disorders, 
abnormal mental states, low intellectual functioning, and certain personality 
traits.65 Status as a juvenile similarly magnifies a suspect’s susceptibly to 
making false confessions because of youths’ intellectual vulnerability and 
simple-minded understanding of promises and threats.66 Finally, innocence 
itself can contribute to a suspect’s inclination to confess because innocents 
often believe their actual innocence will eventually prevail, they trust the 
criminal justice system, or they believe in a just world in which people get 
what they deserve.67 
False confessions are ultimately a product of unduly coercive tech-
niques used by law enforcement and personal attributes that increase a sus-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 51 (explaining individual characteristics 
unique to the suspect that can heighten the chances of a false confession). 
 64 Id.; see J. Pete Blair, The Roles of Interrogation, Perception, and Individual Differences in 
Producing Compliant False Confessions, 13 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 173, 173, 183 (2007) (finding 
interrogation tactics alone explained only a trivial amount of variance, whereas perceptions and 
individual differences each explained significant amounts of the variance in false confessions). 
 65 See Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Psychological Vulnerabilities During Police Interviews. Why Are 
They Important?, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 161, 167 (2010) (arguing that there 
are typically four types of psychological vulnerabilities relevant to the psychological or psychiat-
ric evaluation of suspects in criminal cases). These vulnerabilities have been labeled “mental dis-
order” (i.e., mental illness, learning disabilities, personality disorder), “abnormal mental state” 
(e.g., anxiety, mood disturbance, phobias, bereavement, intoxication, or withdrawal from drugs or 
alcohol), “intellectual functioning” (e.g., borderline IQ scores), and “personality” (e.g., suggesti-
bility, compliance, and acquiescence). Id. 
 66 Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 52; Why Are Youth Susceptible to False Confes-
sions?, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.innocenceproject.org/why-are-youth-
susceptible-to-false-confessions/ [https://perma.cc/537X-KWYD]. In one study, participants of 
varying age groups were led to believe they crashed a computer when in fact they had not, and 
results showed that younger participants were more likely to admit guilt. See generally Allison D. 
Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of 
Age and Suggestibility, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141 (2002) (presenting study on juveniles’ vulnera-
bility to make false confessions). In 2013, the National Registry of Exonerations reported that of 
all the exonerations of youth in the past twenty-five years, thirty-eight percent involved false con-
fessions. Why Are Youth Susceptible to False Confessions?, supra. 
 67 See Kassin, supra note 56, at 251 (finding innocence heightens risk of false confession); 
Saul Kassin & Rebecca Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of Inno-
cence, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 218 (2004) (explaining why innocence heightens risk of falsely 
confessing). Other studies suggest innocents’ vulnerability may also stem from people commonly 
overestimating how visible their true thoughts and emotions are to others. See Tomas Gilovich et 
al., The Illusion of Transparency: Biased Assessments of Others’ Ability to Read One’s Emotional 
States, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 332, 333–34 (1998) (finding people overestimate the 
ability of others to detect their emotional state). 
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pect’s vulnerability to such pressure.68 But this list of situational and per-
sonal risk factors is not exhaustive, nor do these factors operate inde-
pendently from one another.69 
4. Persuasiveness of Promise-Induced Confessions in the Courtroom 
Despite the demonstrated fallibility of confessions, such evidence re-
mains extremely influential in the courtroom.70 For example, studies show 
that confessions have more impact than other forms of powerful evidence 
such as eyewitness and character testimony.71 Confessions produced by 
promises of leniency in particular ascertain their strength from the public’s 
inability to detect, comprehend, and properly weigh such promises.72 
First, it is often difficult to recognize the existence of a promise of le-
niency.73 For example, the common use of implied promises of leniency, 
rather than explicit ones, makes the circumstances of interrogation that give 
rise to inadmissible confessions difficult to detect.74 A confession will be 
inadmissible at trial when it was coerced and not the product of the sus-
pect’s free will.75 Yet coercion is much easier to identify when an officer 
explicitly assures a suspect that he will receive a specific benefit for his 
confession rather than merely hints that his confession will be generally 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safe-
guards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 517. 
 69 See Kassin, supra note 35, at 114 (listing interactive factors contributing to suspects’ vul-
nerability); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 56 (same); Johnson, supra note 52, at 728 
(same). 
 70 See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 56 (studying the persuasive power of false 
confessions at trial). 
 71 Id. at 57; see Kassin & Neumann, supra note 16, at 481 (conducting mock jury studies to 
evaluate the comparative impact of confession evidence and finding confession evidence raised 
the conviction rate more than eyewitness testimony or character evidence). 
 72 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 234, 248 (finding direct promises are more often 
excluded than implied promises because they are easier to identify); see also Kassin, supra note 
15, at 228–29 (commenting on the general population’s inability to understand the coercive effects 
associated with promises of leniency); SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, Confes-
sion Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67, 82–83 (Saul M. 
Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985) (remarking on laypersons’ difficulty in discount-
ing confessions induced by promises of leniency). 
 73 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 234, 248 (finding that judges much more frequent-
ly exclude confessions produced by direct promises than implied promises); Leo et al., supra note 
68, at 530 (reporting on the difficultly of assessing what an officer said to a suspect in the absence 
of a full recording of the interrogation). 
 74 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 234, 248 (finding that judges much more frequent-
ly exclude confessions produced by direct promises than implied promises). 
 75 See Leo et al., supra note 68, at 496 (explaining the admissibility of confessions); Stephen 
J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867–69 (1981) (analyzing the 
development of the Supreme Court’s due process “voluntariness” test). 
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beneficial.76 For example, in State v. Jackson, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court ruled that the defendant’s confession was not coerced in part because 
he was not explicitly promised a lighter sentence, even though the defend-
ant was reassured that if he confessed the court would view him as coopera-
tive.77 Furthermore, implicit promises also allow involuntary confessions to 
be admitted at trial because their precise language is more easily forgot-
ten.78 Both officers and defendants generally have understandable difficulty 
remembering the exact dialogue of an interrogation, and thus are unable to 
adequately articulate what gave rise to a suspect’s justified inference at a 
suppression hearing.79 
Unfortunately, even explicit promises often do not make it on the rec-
ord, and are thus similarly imperceptible to juries.80 For example, Calvin’s 
Court Reported Statement chronicles his post-admission narrative in re-
sponse to an officer’s series of questions, but does not include the initial 
promises used to elicit Calvin’s original confession.81 Therefore, even 
where a promise was made explicitly, there may be a sharp disagreement at 
trial between the defendant and the officer over what was said that can ob-
scure the existence of that promise to a jury.82 This credibility battle is fur-
ther exacerbated by the situation faced by the defense attorney who must 
persuade the jury that the defendant is unreliable enough to have signed a 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Leo et al., supra note 68, at 496 (explaining the admissibility of confessions); Kassin & 
McNall, supra note 53, at 234, 248 (studying implicit promises). 
 77 State v. Jackson, 304 S.E.2d 134, 150, 153 (N.C. 1983), overruled on other grounds by 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), as recognized in State v. Abbott, 358 S.E.2d 365, 369 
(N.C. 1987). 
 78 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1121. 
 79 See id. (explaining how subtlety of implicit promise language poses challenge to human 
memory). This difficulty is exacerbated by the infrequency of videotaping interrogations. Johnson, 
supra note 52, at 720. 
 80 See GARRETT, supra note 35, at 28 (finding none of the interrogations of exonerees who 
falsely confessed were recorded in their entirety); Garrett, supra note 14, at 1054–55 (finding one 
exoneree who falsely confessed was subjected to several hours of interrogation throughout multi-
ple sessions, but officers only used a recorder in one session, periodically turned it on and off, and 
ultimately only recorded 35 minutes); Johnson, supra note 52, at 720 (finding officers rarely rec-
ord interrogations); Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 
11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5 (1992) (finding it rare that an entire interrogation is recorded). 
 81 Statement of Calvin Ollins to Chicago Police re: Investigation of the Fatal Beating and 
Sexual Assault of Lori Roscetti, at 1–11 (Jan. 26, 1987), https://www.convictingtheinnocent.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ollins_calvin_court_reported_statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/X58A-
MQLK]. 
 82 See Johnson, supra note 52, at 720 (finding officers rarely record interrogations); Leo et al., 
supra note 68, at 530 (arguing the absence of a recording makes it difficult for a judge or jury to 
assess what transpired during an interrogation). 
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false confession, but reliable enough that his version of the interrogation 
should be believed over the officer’s version.83 
Second, even when promises of leniency are properly acknowledged, 
the general population does not fully comprehend their strong psychologi-
cally coercive effects.84 In one study, college students representative of lay 
people were presented with twenty-two different interrogation scenarios and 
asked to rate how much pressure the police had put on the suspect.85 These 
students rated promises of leniency and immunity as only moderately coer-
cive and on par with depriving a suspect of telephone contact with others, 
awakening the suspect from sleep, and having a minister urge the suspect to 
confess.86 Students also predicted that innocent suspects were more likely to 
confess under “more coercive” conditions such as threats of harm or punish-
ment and deprivation of basic necessities than when confronted with promis-
es of leniency.87 Another study not only examined laypeople’s ratings of the 
coerciveness of certain interrogation tactics, but also focused on how likely 
they thought the tactics were to elicit true or false confessions.88 The study 
confirmed that people tend to deem promises of leniency as less coercive than 
threats of harm, even when the two are objectively equivalent in the amount 
of behavioral compliance they produce.89 Furthermore, it demonstrated that 
people believe promises of leniency are substantially more likely to elicit a 
true confession than a false confession.90 
Third, even when people find confessions produced by promises of le-
niency to be involuntary and consequently inadmissible, they still struggle 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Johnson, supra note 52, at 720 (explaining the bind defense attorneys are in when 
forced to argue their client is trustworthy but gave a false confession). 
 84 See Kassin, supra note 15, at 228–29 (presenting the results of a study that examined peo-
ples’ understanding of coercive interrogation techniques). 
 85 Id. Specifically, students were instructed to rate on a ten-point scale how much pressure the 
police put on the suspect and to estimate the percentages of truly guilty and truly innocent suspects 
who would confess. Id. 
 86 Id. In contrast, students rated the threat of harm or punishment as the most coercive and on 
par with the use of maximization, the actual infliction of physical pain and discomfort, and depri-
vation of basic needs for food, water, and sleep. Id. 
 87 Id. In the situation rated the least pressure-filled, for example, participants predicted that 
innocents would falsely confess less than 1% of the time, whereas in in the situation rated the 
highest pressure-filled, participants predicted that innocents would falsely confess 62% of the 
time. Id. 
 88 Richard A. Leo & Brittany Liu, What Do Potential Jurors Know About Police Interroga-
tion Techniques and False Confessions?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 381, 393–94 (2009). 
 89 Id. at 394. Participants rated explicit and implicit threats of physical harm as coercive with 
mean ratings of 4.33 and 4.07 respectively, while explicit and implicit promises of leniency re-
ceived lower ratings, with mean ratings of 3.67 and 3.37, respectively. Id. 
 90 Id. at 395. Participants rated confronting a suspect with false evidence of guilt as most 
likely to elicit true confessions, followed by promises of leniency and accusations/re-accusations 
of guilt. Id. They recognized that the direct threat of physical violence was more likely to elicit 
false confessions. Id. 
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to discount them in reaching a verdict.91 After reading trial transcripts, 
mock jurors, participating in a study, fully rejected confessions made under 
the threat of harm in their verdicts, but utilized confessions made under the 
promise of leniency.92 They contended that the confession was inadmissible 
by law, but nonetheless returned a guilty verdict.93 Furthermore, research 
has shown that this bias is not discarded even when jurors are given a bare 
instruction to discount a confession they find involuntary.94 
These scientific studies are consistent with more anecdotal evidence 
collected from the experience of several DNA exonerees.95 Calvin’s afore-
mentioned false confession to robbery, rape, and murder was likely the 
product of his age, low IQ, and officers’ suggestions of leniency.96 Calvin 
may have reasonably concluded that the officers’ promise to release him in 
exchange for a confession outweighed the costs of maintaining his inno-
cence.97 Perhaps more dramatically, a jury convicted Jeffrey Deskovic of 
rape and murder even though his false confession was the only evidence 
linking him to the crime and DNA tests before trial revealed swabs from the 
victim’s body contained another man’s semen.98 In his closing argument, 
the District Attorney stressed that there were “no threats of violence” against 
Deskovic and stated “Handcuffs placed on him? Guns drawn? Beatings? 
None of this.”99 The positive reinforcement that lead to Deskovic’s false con-
fession was his belief that he was working toward helping the police solve the 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 82–83. 
 92 Id.; see Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial In-
struction, and Mock Juror Verdicts, J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 497 (1981). 
 93 Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 67–94; Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 92, at 
497. 
 94 Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 67–94; Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 92, at 
497. 
 95 See GARRETT, supra note 35, at 16–17 (reporting on circumstances concerning wrongful 
convictions). 
 96 See Gudjonsson, supra note 65, at 167 (identifying low intellectual functioning as personal 
risk factor for falsely confessing); White, supra note 4, at 1022–24 (speculating about the circum-
stances of Calvin’s confession); Dellios, supra note 2 (explaining Calvin’s purported rationale for 
confessing). 
 97 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 235 (explaining the commonality of “pragmatic 
implication,” the sending and processing of implicit meanings in communication, as occurs when 
an individual “reads between the lines” or when information or meaning is inferred from what a 
speaker is saying or suggesting); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1001–77, 1117 (explaining that 
according to rational choice theory, the combination of perceived limited options and consequenc-
es, including consequences from promises of leniency, results in suspects’ decisions that it is more 
beneficial to confess than maintain innocence); Dellios, supra note 2 (reporting officers promised 
Calvin that he could go home if he confessed). 
 98 GARRETT, supra note 35, at 16–17. 
 99 Id. at 16 (citing Trial Transcript, at 1507–08, State v. Jeffrey Deskovic, No. 192–90 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 4, 1990)). 
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crime and officers’ promise to “get the guy responsible.”100 But according to 
officers, Deskovic gradually realized “that the guy was him.”101 In short, con-
fessions are so inherently prejudicial that people do not fully discount the ev-
idence even when logically and legally appropriate to do so.102 
B. Constraints on Confession Testimony 
The Supreme Court, partially motivated by the heavy weight jurors as-
sign confession testimony, set forth guidelines in 1897 intended to exclude 
involuntary confessions from being admitted at trial.103 The currently recog-
nized constitutional protections against involuntary confessions are based 
upon both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination.104 The underly-
ing aim of these safeguards has continuously shifted over time between en-
suring reliability, protecting free will, and honoring fundamental fairness.105 
1. The Due Process “Voluntariness” Test and Reliability Determinations 
The Supreme Court first held the admission of an “involuntary” con-
fession in a criminal trial violates due process in Brown v. Mississippi in 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. at 15. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 83 (finding jurors perceive that confessions in-
duced by promises are more likely to be truthful than those induced by other coercive practices). 
 103 See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (holding that an involuntary confes-
sion was inadmissible). 
 104 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV; see Brown, 297 U.S. at 286 (holding an inquiry 
into the admissibility of a confession is controlled in part by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, which requires state action to be “consistent with the fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice”); Bram, 168 U.S. at 542 (holding inquiry into voluntariness of confession is 
controlled by the Fifth Amendment’s command that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself”). 
 105 See Yale Kamisar, What Is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and 
Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 742–43 (1963) (argu-
ing the Court originally viewed the term “voluntary” as interchangeable with “trustworthy” and 
“reliable”); Leo et al., supra note 68, at 494 (arguing the Supreme Court’s shifting underlying 
rationale for its due process voluntariness decisions loosely corresponds to the goals of criminal 
justice system of promoting truth-finding, protecting individual rights, and checking state power). 
Although at times the underlying rationale appeared to be excluding untrustworthy evidence, the 
Court also sought to prevent unfairness and deter oppressive and unfair police interrogation meth-
ods. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 240 (1941) (holding due process requirement as 
applied to confessions was not intended to prevent the admissibility of false confessions at trial, 
but instead prevent unfairness to the defendant, regardless of whether the confession was true or 
false); see also Malinski, 324 U.S. at 405–07 (finding that a defendant’s confession after seven 
hours of periodic and soft questioning was involuntary because he was stripped and kept naked for 
three hours before being provided a blanket); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154–55 (1944) 
(finding a defendant’s confession involuntary because he was interrogated in isolation continuous-
ly for thirty-six hours). 
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1936, but it was not always clear which rationale the Court was relying up-
on in Brown’s progeny.106 The Court’s holdings have evolved to require a 
balancing test that examines pressures and police techniques during interro-
gation, as they interacted with the suspect’s personal vulnerabilities, to de-
termine whether they were sufficient to render a confession involuntary by 
overbearing on the suspect’s capacity for autonomous choice.107 Now, if a 
suspect’s confession is coerced and not the product of his or her free will, it 
will be inadmissible at trial.108 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Schulhofer, supra note 75, at 867–69 (1981) (analyzing the development of the Su-
preme Court’s due process “voluntariness” test). In the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi, the 
Court reversed the convictions of three black tenant farmers who had confessed to murder after 
they were tortured. 297 U.S. at 281, 287. The farmers specifically confessed to murdering a white 
man after being whipped and pummeled. Id. The Court appeared concerned that involuntary con-
fessions are inherently less trustworthy, and that their unreliability violates defendants’ rights to 
fundamental fairness. See id. at 283 (focusing on the effect of physical discomfort on the defend-
ants’ state of mind in holding their confessions involuntary); Welsh S. White, False Confessions 
and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 105, 112 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s initial voluntariness test was seen as a 
trustworthiness test). In 1940, Wigmore stated that the sole principle involved in the test for ad-
missibility of confessions was trustworthiness. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 822, 823 (3d ed. 1940). 
Years later in 1970, Wigmore again endorsed this view and argued that confessions should not be 
excluded because of any illegality in the methods used in obtaining them or because of any con-
nection with the privilege against self-incrimination alone. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823, at 337–
38 n.2 (Chadbourne rev. 1970). In the 1941 case of Lisenba v. California, however, the Supreme 
Court made clear that reliability is not the central due process concern raised by involuntary con-
fessions. See 314 U.S. at 236 (holding due process requirement was not intended to prevent the 
admissibility of false confessions at trial, but rather prevent unfairness to the defendant, regardless 
of whether the confession was true or false). The Court instead appeared to reason that it was an 
interrogator’s use of overly oppressive methods that violates a defendant’s due process rights. Id. 
at 236. With this focus in mind, the Court declared that holding the defendant in custody without 
counsel for two days prior to his arraignment for the murder of his wife did not render the admis-
sion of his confession a violation of due process and affirmed the decision to deny the defendant a 
writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 240. The Court relied on this rationale in several cases following 
Lisenba. See Malinski, 324 U.S. at 405–07 (finding a defendant’s confession after seven hours of 
periodic and soft questioning was involuntary because he was stripped and kept naked for three 
hours before being provided a blanket); Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 154–55 (finding a defendant’s con-
fession involuntary because he was interrogated in isolation continuously for thirty-six hours). 
 107 Leo et al., supra note 68, at 496 (arguing the voluntariness test has evolved to focus on 
whether suspects’ free will was overcome by coercive interrogation methods); Schulhofer, supra 
note 75, at 867 (arguing that the voluntariness test was concerned with whether the totality of the 
circumstances indicated suspects’ will had been overcome). 
 108 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. 
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); Leo et al., supra note 68, at 496. State action, typically in the 
form of police coercion, is a necessary predicate for any finding that the admission of a statement 
violates due process. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–65 (1986). Confessions which are 
the product of violence are per se involuntary, but confessions which are the product of psycho-
logical coercion remain subject to this totality of the circumstances balancing test. Id. at 164; 29 
AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 739, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2019). 
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Trial judges hold pre-trial hearings to determine whether a confession 
was voluntary and if its admission would be constitutional.109 The lack of a 
bright line rule compels courts to determine the voluntariness of a confes-
sion on a case-by-case basis.110 As a result, the application of this balancing 
test has been widely criticized for leaving police without sufficient and 
much needed guidance, impairing judicial review, and allowing considera-
ble interrogation pressure, among other concerns.111 
If the judge finds a confession voluntary, he or she may admit the con-
fession either with or without a special instruction to the jury requiring them 
to make an independent determination of voluntariness and to disregard 
statements they find were involuntary products of coercion.112 In contrast to 
                                                                                                                           
 109 GARRETT, supra note 35, at 37. If the only possible finding at this pre-trial motion to sup-
press is that the confession was involuntary in violation of the Fourteen Amendment the judge 
must exclude the confession. Note, The Role of Judge and Jury in Determining a Confession’s 
Voluntariness, 48 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 59, 60–61 (1957) [hereinafter The 
Role of Judge and Jury]. 
 110 See Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 309, 351, 353 (1998) (observing the court’s role in protecting due process is identifying 
presence of circumstances in which defendants’ will is in fact overborne on a case-by-case basis 
and noting there is no “litmus test” or “bright line” for determining this question). But see 
Schulhofer, supra note 75, at 874 (critiquing case-by-case basis approach). 
 111 Schulhofer, supra note 75, at 869–74. The ambiguity of the totality of the circumstances 
approach makes it unpredictable in practice, and consequently police cannot foresee how a court 
will evaluate a confession. Id. at 869. Appellate courts are unlikely to overrule trial court judg-
ments on the issue of voluntariness because the fact intensive nature of the inquiry seems to de-
mand deference at the appellate level. Id. Ultimately, the vagueness of the totality of the circum-
stances test excluded few confessions, even when they seemed to be products of coercion, because 
judges gave weight to their own subjective preferences. See Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the In-
voluntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 
93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 470 (2005) (finding the “wiggle room” and subjective nature of the volun-
tariness test allowed judges substantial freedom in interpreting facts of an interrogation to find 
confessions admissible). 
 112 Aaron J. Good, You Made Me Promises, Promises: Determining the Existence of Promises 
of Leniency During Custodial Interrogation and the Proper Standard of Review [State v. Sharp, 
210 P.3d 590 (Kan. 2009)], 49 WASHBURN L.J. 905, 915 (2010) (finding that Kansas treats the 
existence of a promise as a question of fact for the jury to decide); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra 
note 32, at 36, 56 (noting that juries are expected, implicitly or explicitly, to determine whether a 
confession was voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances). Under the California “ortho-
dox” rule, the judge admits confessions which he or she finds voluntary and the function of the 
jury is to determine the weight and credibility of the confession. Kassin & Wrightsman, supra 
note 72, at 81. In contrast, under New York procedure and the Massachusetts “humane” rule, the 
judge admits which confessions he or she finds voluntary with an instruction to the jury that they 
must make an independent determination of voluntariness before considering its credibility and 
relying on it in reaching a verdict, which increases the jury’s role in the voluntariness test. Id.; The 
Role of Judge and Jury, supra note 109, at 60. The following is an excerpt from the current volun-
tariness instruction given in Massachusetts: 
You have heard testimony about a statement allegedly made by the defendant con-
cerning the offense which is charged in this case. Before you may consider any such 
statement, you are going to have to make a preliminary determination whether it can 
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voluntariness instructions, judges may also rely on credibility instructions 
that focus on the reliability of the defendant’s incriminating statements.113 
                                                                                                                           
be considered as evidence or not. You may not consider any such statement in your 
deliberations unless, from all the evidence in the case, the Commonwealth has prov-
en beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made the statement that he (she) is 
alleged to have made, and that he (she) made it voluntarily, freely and rationally. 
MASSACHUSETTS JURY INSTRUCTION 3.560: CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS (HUMANE PRACTICE) 
(2018), https://www.mass.gov/doc/3560-confessions-and-admissions-humane-practice/download 
[https://perma.cc/97QR-V8UA]. Massachusetts also provides the following expanded charge on 
voluntariness: 
In determining whether or not any statement made by the defendant was voluntary, 
you may consider all of the surrounding circumstances. You may take into account 
the nature and duration of any conversations that the police officers had with the de-
fendant. You may consider where and when the statement was made. You may con-
sider any evidence you have heard about the defendant’s physical and mental condi-
tion, his (her) intelligence, age, education, and experience . . . . Your decision does 
not turn on any one factor; you must consider the totality of the circumstances. 
Id. Some courts also permit expert testimony on false confessions. See Danielle E. Chojnacki et 
al., An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1, 39 (2008) (arguing for expert testimony on false confessions to enhance jurors’ ability to 
evaluate confession evidence); Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cas-
es, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 105, 113, 114 (2003) (examining admissibility of expert testimony on 
false confessions). 
 113 Dayna M. Gomes et al., Examining the Judicial Decision to Substitute Credibility Instruc-
tions for Expert Testimony on Confessions, 21 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 319, 321 
(2016). For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts cautions the jury to weigh 
confessions with great care when they resulted from an unrecorded interrogation. Commonwealth 
v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Mass. 2004); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 60. 
In DiGiambattista, there was a factual dispute over whether an implicit promise was made to the 
defendant during an unrecorded interrogation that “counseling” would follow his confession. 813 
N.E.2d at 525. The Supreme Judicial Court held that when police do not record an interrogation, 
the defendant may request a jury instruction “advising that the State’s highest court has expressed 
a preference that such interrogations be recorded whenever practicable,” that the jury “should 
weigh evidence of the defendant’s alleged statement with great caution and care,” and that the 
“absence of a recording permits (but does not compel) them to conclude that the Commonwealth 
has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 533–34. Several scholars have 
advocated for educational credibility instructions on confession evidence. See generally Angela 
M. Jones & Steven Penrod, Research-Based Instructions Induce Sensitivity to Confession Evi-
dence, 25 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 257 (2017) (arguing for science-based instructions on 
coercive interrogation techniques). Credibility instructions have been advocated for and given in 
similar contexts, such as in cases with eyewitness identification testimony. See Marlee Kind Dil-
lon et al., Henderson Instructions: Do They Enhance Evidence Evaluation?, 17 J. FORENSIC PSY-
CHOL. PRAC., 1, 17, 18 (2017) (finding Henderson juror instructions on eyewitness identification 
based on scientific research enhance jurors’ skepticism of eyewitness testimony); Nell B. Pawlen-
ko et al., A Teaching Aid for Improving Jurors’ Assessment of Eyewitness Accuracy, 27 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 190, 195 (2013) (finding that educating jurors about eyewitness identifica-
tion based on scientific research increases the likelihood of a guilty verdict); Christian Sheehan, 
Making the Jurors the “Experts”: The Case for Eyewitness Identification Jury Instructions, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 651, 674 (2011) (arguing for jury instructions on eyewitness identifications). 
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Although reliability can be considered in weighing a confession, the Su-
preme Court has ruled out reliability as a reason to exclude a confession.114 
2. The Privilege Against Self Incrimination and Miranda 
In 1966, the Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona that the admis-
sion of a confession given within a custodial interrogation violates the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the absence of a knowing 
waiver of certain constitutional rights.115 The Miranda warning itself, as well 
as the exclusion of confessions given in its absence, are procedures intended 
to protect both the suspect’s ability to make autonomous decisions and the 
reliability of his or her confession.116 These Miranda guidelines have been 
scrutinized for failing to meet such policy goals.117 Foremost, a majority of 
suspects waive their Miranda rights and many of the characteristics that make 
a suspect vulnerable to waiving their rights are the same as those that make a 
suspect vulnerable to giving a false confession.118 Secondly, once the interro-
                                                                                                                           
 114 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (holding that an unreliable confession was nevertheless admis-
sible because unreliability is an issue of evidentiary law, not due process); Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 
236 (holding that due process is intended to prevent unfair use of evidence, regardless of that 
evidence’s truth or falsity); GARRETT, supra note 35, at 40. In Connelly, a mentally ill man suffer-
ing from psychotic delusions that God wanted him to confess to murder or commit suicide, walked 
up to a police officer and confessed to a murder. 479 U.S. at 160–61. After the state was unable to 
corroborate that there had been any recent unsolved murder and after the state-employed psychia-
trist offered uncontested testimony about the defendant’s delusions, the Court found that the con-
fession was unreliable. Id. Nonetheless, the Court also found there were no applicable constitu-
tional constraints on its admissibility. Id. at 167. 
 115 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (holding that prior to any custodial interrogation, the person 
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used 
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed). The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id. The application of Miranda’s protections is limited to 
custodial interrogations, which Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “[p]olice questioning of a de-
tained person about the crime that he or she is suspected of having committed.” Id. at 444; Inter-
rogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In contrast, a noncustodial interrogation 
involves police questioning a suspect who has not been detained and can leave at will. Interroga-
tion, supra. 
 116 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 
U.S. 719, 730 (1966)) (holding that Miranda serves to guard against “the use of unreliable state-
ments at trial”). 
 117 See Garrett, supra note 14, at 1058 (arguing Miranda failed to procure the reliability of 
convicts’ confessions where DNA testing later proved their confessions false); Ofshe & Leo, su-
pra note 53, at 1116 (critiquing Miranda for not protecting against admission of unreliable state-
ments); Penney, supra note 110, at 366–67 (arguing Miranda does not properly protect autono-
mous choice). 
 118 Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1116 (finding 78.29% of suspects waive their Miranda 
rights based on nine months of fieldwork and observation of 122 interrogations in the Criminal 
Investigation Division of a major urban police department and observations of sixty videotaped 
interrogations in two other police departments); see Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Assessment of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
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gator recites the Miranda warnings and obtains a waiver, Miranda no longer 
offers any protection against the possibility of a false confession.119 
3. The Admissibility of Promise-Induced Confessions at Trial 
Although promises of leniency are a relevant consideration, courts 
generally hold they are not coercive enough, in the absence of other factors, 
to render a confession involuntary.120 Particularly, courts have held that a 
                                                                                                                           
839, 851–52, 859 (1996) (finding 83.7% of suspects waive their Miranda rights based on six 
weeks of field work attending screening sessions of 219 interrogations in the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney’s office); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 39 (finding that the same 
characteristics heighten the chance of a false confession and a waiver of rights). For example, 
people who typically defer to authority figures, such as youth and mentally handicapped suspects, 
are more likely to waive their Miranda rights. See Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exer-
cise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 45 n.58, 57 
(2006) (finding that youth are more likely to wave Miranda rights); Solomon M. Fulero & Caro-
line Everington, Assessing Competency to Waive Miranda Rights in Defendants with Mental Re-
tardation, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 534 (1995) (finding that mentally retarded adults waive 
their Miranda rights at a higher rate because they desire to please others and are more susceptible 
to coercion); Kassin, supra note 56, at 251 (finding more than 90% of interrogated youth waive 
their Miranda rights); Kassin et al., supra note 13, at 8 (finding juveniles and adults with mental 
disabilities more likely to waive Miranda rights and less likely to understand those rights and the 
consequences of waiving them). Innocence also puts suspects at risk for waiving their Miranda 
rights. See Kassin, supra note 56, at 251 (finding 81% of innocent suspects signed a waiver be-
cause they felt they “had nothing to hide,” whereas only 36% of guilty suspects signed a Miranda 
waiver); Kassin & Norwick, supra note 67, at 211–21 (finding, in a study of seventy-two partici-
pants who were guilty or innocent of a mock theft, participants who were truly innocent were 
significantly more likely to sign a waiver than those who were guilty); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 
53, at 1117 (finding innocent suspects more likely to waive Miranda rights because they are likely 
to believe that ending the interrogation will lead to arrest, whereas continuing interrogation may 
lead to officer recognizing their innocence). 
 119 See Garrett, supra note 14, at 1058 (noting all forty convicts exonerated by DNA who 
falsely confessed waived their Miranda rights and thus enjoyed no Miranda protections); Leo et 
al., supra note 68, at 498 (observing that, once waived, Miranda rights offer no protection against 
subsequent coercive interrogation techniques). 
 120 Custodial Interrogations, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 181, 206 (2011); see Unit-
ed States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that promises of leniency do not 
render a suspect’s statement involuntary unless, under the totality of the circumstances, they clear-
ly overbore the suspect’s free will); United States v. Bye, 919 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding 
that promises of leniency do not render a suspect’s statement involuntary in the absence of other 
circumstances); see, e.g., United States v. Binford, 818 F.3d 261, 266, 272 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 621 (2017) (holding officer’s promise of “you help me, I help you” to suspect 
accused of possession of drugs and firearm did not render suspect’s statements involuntary per se); 
United States v. Turner, 674 F.3d 420, 433 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding officer’s promise that if sus-
pect accused of robbery could “get it straight,” he could see his four-year-old daughter’s first day 
of school did not render suspect’s statements involuntary per se); United States v. Charles, 476 
F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding officer’s promise to suspect accused of selling cocaine that 
the District Attorney would give him favorable treatment did not render suspect’s statements in-
voluntary per se); United States v. Kilgore, 58 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding officer’s 
promises to suspect accused of mail embezzlement that suspect would not go to jail that evening 
and could retrieve his car from impound lot, did not render confession involuntary per se). 
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defendant’s incriminating statement is not rendered involuntary by promises 
to make a suspect’s cooperation known to prosecutors or judges.121 Courts are 
similarly hesitant to declare that promises related to a suspect’s sentence or 
probation situation render his confession involuntary.122 In addition, Courts 
usually hold that even outright promises not to prosecute the suspect or 
make an arrest do not per se overbear his or her free will or capacity for 
self-determination.123 In rare circumstances, promises of leniency are con-
                                                                                                                           
 121 See, e.g., United States v. Swan, 842 F.3d 28, 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding officer’s 
promise to suspect accused of economic crimes that he would bring suspect’s cooperation to the 
prosecutor’s attention did not render suspect’s statements involuntary); United States v. Stokes, 
631 F.3d 802, 808 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding officer’s promise to suspect accused of bank robbery 
that he would notify the prosecutor of suspect’s cooperation did not render suspect’s statements 
involuntary); United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 297, 299 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding agent’s 
promise to suspect accused of unlawful possession of a firearm that he would make suspect’s 
cooperation known to prosecutor and judge did not render suspect’s statements involuntary); Al-
ston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1254 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding investigators’ promise to suspect 
accused of robbery, that he would recommend to prosecution that suspect’s cooperation allow him 
to plead to one count of first degree robbery, did not render suspect’s confession involuntary). 
 122 See, e.g., United States v. Villalpando, 588 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding of-
ficer’s promise to suspect accused of selling cocaine that she would try to persuade probation 
officer not to revoke probation did not render suspect’s confession involuntary); United States v. 
Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 746 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding officer’s promise to suspect accused of mur-
der, kidnapping and rape that authorities would not pursue the death penalty did not render sus-
pect’s confessions involuntary); Okafor, 285 F.3d at 847 (holding agent’s promise to suspect ac-
cused of drug offense that cooperation could help him avoid lengthy prison sentence did not ren-
der suspect’s confession involuntary); United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 752–53 (11th Cir. 
1990) (holding officer’s implied promise to suspect accused of conspiring and attempting to im-
port cocaine that cooperating defendants generally “fared better time-wise,” did not render sus-
pect’s confession involuntary); United States v. Davidson, 768 F.2d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(holding DEA agent’s promise to suspect accused of selling marijuana that suspect could receive 
shorter sentence if he cooperated did not render suspect’s confession involuntary). 
 123 See United States v. Thunderhawk, 799 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding FBI 
agent’s promise that defendant would not be arrested at interview’s closing did not render defend-
ant’s incriminating statements involving sexual abuse of minor involuntary); United States v. 
Estey, 595 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding officer’s assurance that suspect accused of 
crimes relating to child pornography would not be arrested at interview’s closing, which suspect 
misunderstood to be offer of total immunity, did not render suspect’s confession involuntary); 
United States v. Craft, 495 F.3d 259, 263–64 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding officer’s promise that he 
was “not interested in the drugs” but only in the homicide did not render suspect’s confession 
involuntary); United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 112–13 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding FBI agent’s 
promise to suspect accused of narcotics trafficking conspiracy that he would not use suspect’s 
statements to prosecute her did not render suspect’s confession involuntary); United States v. 
Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 202–03 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding officer’s assurance that suspect accused 
of unlawful possession of a firearm would not be arrested if he cooperated did not render suspect’s 
confession involuntary); United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding 
FBI agents’ promise of immunity for surveillance to suspect accused of conspiracy to commit 
extortion and racketeering did not render suspect’s statements regarding surveillance involuntary); 
United States v. Otters, 197 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding officer’s promise to suspect 
accused of selling methamphetamine that he would not file state charges associated with traffic 
stop if defendant cooperated did not render suspect’s statements involuntary); United States v. 
Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 406–08 (1st Cir. 1998) (officer’s assurance to suspect accused of possession 
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sidered sufficiently coercive to render a confession involuntary when com-
bined with additional factors such as age, low IQ, officers’ exaggeration of 
incriminating evidence or other coercive techniques.124 Yet in many in-
stances, the court has entirely failed to recognize that a statement constitut-
ed a promise of leniency where the promise was implied rather than explic-
it, and in some cases, that a statement was even made at all.125 But confession 
                                                                                                                           
of a firearm as a felon that suspect was not in danger of prosecution for making statements at trial 
of another person did not render the incriminating statements he made at that trial involuntary); 
United States v. Larry, 126 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding officer’s promise to suspect 
accused of possessing ammunition that suspect would be released from jail and avoid prosecution 
for drive-by-shooting did not render suspect’s confession regarding shotgun involuntary); Sprosty 
v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 646–47 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding officer’s promise to suspect accused of 
sexual crimes that burglary charges in another state would be dropped did not render suspect’s 
confession to sexual assault and exploitation of child involuntary); United States v. Matthews, 942 
F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding officer’s promises to release suspect if he identified cer-
tain drug operators at airport and that there would be no state charges and probably no federal 
charges if suspect cooperated were insufficient to render suspect’s statements involuntary). But 
see United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding officer’s assurance to 
suspect accused of armed robbery that anything defendant said would not be used to prosecute 
him rendered defendant’s confession in his bedroom to credit card fraud involuntary). 
 124 See United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1010, 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding 
officers’ promise to suspect accused of aggravated sexual abuse of minor that he would not “tell 
this [confession] to anybody” contributed to involuntariness of confession where suspect was 18, 
had IQ of 65, and officers had exaggerated evidence against suspect); United States v. Lopez, 437 
F.3d 1059, 1061, 1064–66 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding agent’s implied promise that suspect accused 
of murder would spend fifty-four fewer years in prison if he confessed to killing victim by mistake 
contributed to involuntariness of confession where agent reinforced such promise by telling sus-
pect about other suspects’ experiences with confessing, misrepresented and exaggerated evidence 
against suspect, and suspect suffered an unrelated beating two days prior); United States v. Rog-
ers, 906 F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding officer’s assurance that suspect accused of pur-
chasing stolen guns would not be prosecuted contributed to involuntariness of confession where 
officer failed to reveal suspect was target of investigation and used other coercive techniques); 
United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336–37 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding officer’s promise to 
suspect accused of purloining funds that he would bring cooperation to prosecutor’s attention 
contributed to involuntariness of confession where officer also warned the suspect she had “a lot 
at stake,” would not see her two year old child “for a while,” and that he would tell the prosecutor 
she was “stubborn or hard headed” if she did not cooperate). But see United States v. Jacques, 744 
F.3d 804, 807, 808–09 (1st Cir. 2014) (declaring suspect accused of burning a church made state-
ments voluntary despite officers’ promising confession would lead to “softer treatment” by prose-
cutor and judge, warning that failure to cooperate would likely result in maximum sentence, exag-
gerating of strength of evidence against suspect, misrepresenting involvement of high-profile 
federal agents in case, minimizing magnitude of suspect’s criminal conduct, interrupting suspect’s 
attempts to deny guilt, and suggesting that continued resistance would subject suspect to more 
damning media coverage and deprive him of crucial years with his family); United States v. Jack-
son, 608 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding officers’ suggestion to suspect accused of trading 
stolen gun for drugs that cooperation could result in leniency was voluntary despite many officers 
present at apartment and suspect’s resulting nervous demeanor). 
 125 See, e.g., United States v. Li Xin Wu, 668 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 2011) (declaring that a 
suspect of drug related offenses was not promised immunity, despite his claim to the contrary on 
appeal, because the suspect did not present any evidence or move to exclude the statements at 
trial); United States v. Montgomery, 555 F.3d 623, 629–30 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an officer 
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cases with similar fact patterns nonetheless result in different holdings and 
Federal Courts are ultimately in disarray when it comes to identifying prom-
ises of leniency and ruling on the admissibility of any confessions that fol-
low.126 
                                                                                                                           
did not promise a suspect accused of possession of a firearm as a felon that he would not receive a 
ten year sentence if he confessed because officer’s statements were intended to address suspect’s 
concerns that he would be tried on federal rather than state charges); United States v. Mashburn, 
406 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (declaring that an officer did not make promise to a suspect 
accused of possession of a firearm and methamphetamine facing a ten year sentence when he 
claimed that the suspect could only reduce it by cooperating, but instead merely “informed suspect 
of the gravity of his suspected offenses and the benefits of cooperation under the federal system”); 
Thai v. Mapes, 412 F.3d 970, 979 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding an officer’s assurance to a suspect 
accused of murder and terrorism that members of the group involved in the murder would not hurt 
suspect if he made a statement because the officer would protect him did not constitute promise of 
leniency); United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding an officer’s 
remark to a suspect accused of a bank robbery, in answer to arrestee’s question of whether he 
would be charged if he informed officers as to who had committed robbery, that the arrestee 
would be “all right” as long as he had no direct involvement, could not be construed as promise of 
leniency); Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1132–34 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that an of-
ficer’s promise to a suspect accused of murder that he would receive either the death penalty or 
life in prison and that it would be in defendant’s “best interest” to tell the truth did not render the 
suspect’s confession involuntary because the statement did not constitute an implied or express 
promise in this context); United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777, 783 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
an officer’s admonishment to a suspect accused of making false statements during the purchase of 
firearms that the suspect should tell the truth or face consequences was not an implied promise); 
United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that an agent’s comment that 
the United States Attorney could ask for downward sentence departure if the suspect accused of 
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine cooperated was not a promise, but instead was “merely 
pointing out, what is anyway obvious”); United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1033–34 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that officer’s promise to a suspect accused of crimes relating to involvement in 
a drug ring that he would make the suspect’s cooperation known to the U.S. Attorney did not 
constitute promise of leniency because it was clear he would go to prison); Bannister v. Armon-
trout, 4 F.3d 1434, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding a comment made to capital murder suspect that it 
would be in his “best interest to cooperate” did not constitute promise of leniency in death penalty 
case); Bolder v. Armontrout, 921 F.2d 1359, 1366 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a statement to a 
capital murder suspect that telling the truth about a stabbing incident “would be better for him” 
was not an express or implied promise of leniency). 
 126 Compare Preston, 751 F.3d at 1010, 1014, 1028 (holding that officers’ promise to a sus-
pect accused of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor that he would not “tell this [confession] to 
anybody” contributed to the involuntariness of a confession where the suspect was 18, had IQ of 
65, and when the officers exaggerated evidence against suspect), and Lopez, 437 F.3d at 1061, 
1064–66 (holding that an agent’s implied promise that a suspect accused of murder would spend 
54 fewer years in prison if he confessed to killing a victim by mistake contributed to involuntari-
ness of confession where the agent reinforced such promise by telling the suspect about other 
suspects’ experiences with confessing, misrepresented and exaggerated evidence against suspect, 
and where the suspect had suffered an unrelated beating 2 days prior), with Jacques 744 F.3d at 
807, 808–09 (declaring that a suspect accused of burning a church made statements voluntary). In 
Jacques, the court found the arson suspect’s statements voluntary despite officers’ promising that 
the confession would lead to “softer treatment” by the prosecutor and judge, warning that failure 
to cooperate would likely result in maximum sentence, exaggerating the strength of evidence 
against suspect, misrepresenting involvement of high-profile federal agents in case, minimizing 
magnitude of suspect’s criminal conduct, interrupting suspect’s attempts to deny guilt, and sug-
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II. LESSONS FROM PROMISES OF LENIENCY IN ANOTHER CONTEXT 
Promises of leniency are not only used to induce suspects to confess, 
but they are also used to encourage defendants to plead guilty.127 Plea bar-
gaining is the process by which prosecutors induce defendants to confess to 
guilt in court, in exchange for a more favorable outcome than they would 
likely receive following a post-trial finding of guilt.128 Plea bargaining is 
commonplace in the American criminal justice system and now over ninety 
percent of federal criminal cases result in a guilty plea.129 The legitimacy of 
this long standing practice was first recognized in the 1975 amendments to 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and is now governed by 
this rule as well as several Supreme Court decisions.130 Section A of this 
Part overviews the procedures used to obtain a guilty plea, and explains 
how many of the same risk factors that heighten the chance of a false con-
fession also heighten the chance of a false guilty plea.131 Part B points out 
that a willingness to only fully acknowledge the coercive nature of promises 
in the latter has led to inconsistent safeguards.132 
                                                                                                                           
gesting that continued resistance would subject suspect to more damning media coverage and 
deprive him of crucial years with his family. Id. 
 127 Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining 
Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 71–72 (2005) (noting that all guilty pleas necessarily entail a defend-
ant’s choice to confess in exchange for a promise). 
 128 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 1A FED. PRAC. & PROC. Criminal Procedure § 180, 
Westlaw (4th ed., database updated 2018) (explaining the plea bargaining process); McCoy, supra 
note 127, at 71–72 (noting that a guilty plea always results in a defendant foregoing trial). Essen-
tially, plea bargaining facilitates the conservation of judicial resources because the prosecutor is 
relieved of the need to prove the defendant’s guilt at trial and the Court can spare the resources 
that would have been required for such an adjudication. WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 180 (explaining 
government and defendants’ rationale behind guilty pleas). 
 129 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 128, § 180; see Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) 
(discussing that the criminal justice system is dominated by pleas rather than trials); Missouri v. 
Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (stating plea bargaining is essential to the criminal justice system); 
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 634 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that 93% 
of federal criminal cases result in a guilty plea); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bar-
gaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (arguing that plea bargaining is not just an 
appendage to the criminal justice system, but could instead be characterized as the criminal justice 
system itself). See generally DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (1992) (providing a history of defendants’ rights at trial in state and federal 
courts). 
 130 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 128, § 180; see Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775, 780 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (discussing the history of plea bargaining in the U.S. criminal justice system). 
 131 See infra notes 133–149 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 150–172 and accompanying text. 
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A. Promise-Induced False Guilty Pleas 
1. Plea Agreement Procedures 
When a defendant accepts an offer to plead guilty, he or she usually 
waives important rights such as the right to a jury trial, the right to confront 
one’s accusers, the right to appeal, and the privilege against self-incrim-
ination.133 In exchange, the prosecutor promises the defendant leniency in 
the form of a charge reduction or a recommendation for a reduced sentence 
and therefore promises of leniency can be considered part of any guilty 
plea.134 The parties must fully disclose the terms of the deal in open court 
for the court’s consideration.135 Once a court accepts a plea agreement, it is 
binding and a legal remedy is available to the defendant if the prosecutor 
fails to comply with its terms.136 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding guilty pleas and accompanying 
waivers of constitutional rights must be “voluntary” and “knowing, intelligent acts done with 
sufficient awareness of relevant circumstances and likely consequences”); Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (holding admissibility of a confession depends on whether its voluntari-
ness satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant). Each of these rights is now applicable to 
the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147, 
150 (1968) (finding that the right to trial by jury applies to the states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 404 (1965) (finding the right to confrontation applies to the states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states). Alt-
hough there is no constitutional right to appeal, that right is now recognized for all significant 
criminal convictions by state or court rule. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756–57 n.1 (1983) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the right to appeal is “universal” by reason of state or court rule). 
 134 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). There are currently three types of concessions recognized by 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that a prosecutor may offer in return for a guilty plea to 
either the current charge or a lesser or related charge. Id. R. 11(c)(1). A prosecutor can: (A) not 
bring additional charges, or move to dismiss additional charges already filed; (B) recommend, or 
agree not to oppose, the defendant’s request that a particular sentence or sentencing range is ap-
propriate, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sen-
tencing factor does or does not apply; (C) agree that a particular sentence or sentencing range is 
appropriate, or that a particular Sentencing Guideline provision, policy statement, or sentencing 
factor does or does not apply. Id. 
 135 Id. R. 11(c)(1). Only the prosecutor and defense counsel or the defendant personally may 
participate in the plea discussions. Id. This explicit prohibition is intended to prevent even the 
appearance that the judge is pressuring a defendant to plead guilty. See United States v. Davila, 
569 U.S. 597, 606 (2013) (holding the prohibition was included to rid the defendant of any con-
cern that refusing to plead guilty might upset the judge presiding over his subsequent trial); United 
States v. Braxton, 784 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding the three principal interests in curb-
ing judicial participation in plea discussions are diminishing the possibility of judicial coercion, 
protecting against partiality in the judicial process, and eliminating the misleading impression that 
the judge is an advocate for the agreement); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 274 (D.C. Cir. 
1969) (finding any participation by the judge in plea bargaining discussions places “direct and 
immediate pressure” on a defendant to plead guilty). 
 136 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4) (requiring the court’s acceptance of the plea agreement); 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (remanding case to determine whether the 
petitioner was entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement or opportunity to withdraw 
his plea where government broke plea agreement after court accepted it); United States v. Wash-
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2. Similar Situational and Personal Risk Factors 
Despite the prevalence and recognized legitimacy of plea bargains, 
many of the same interdependent situational and personal risk factors that 
heighten the probability of a wrongful conviction in the confession setting 
are also present in the plea negotiation setting.137 One situational risk factor 
present in both interrogators’ and prosecutors’ questioning is their reliance 
on psychological coercion and social influence techniques.138 For example, 
like those who confess, defendants who agree to a plea may be misled about 
the strength of the evidence against them, which in turn produces the false 
acceptance of responsibility.139 Admittance of guilt may also be motivated 
by a rational choice to escape one’s current situation, whether it be the ques-
tioning during an interrogation or imminent jail time during a plea discus-
sion.140 And of course, every guilty plea necessarily involves an inherently 
                                                                                                                           
man, 66 F.3d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding whether guilty plea was binding was contingent on 
the court’s review of presentence report and subsequent acceptance). In 1971, in Santobello v. 
New York, the Court held that when a defendant relies on a prosecutor’s promise in pleading 
guilty, the prosecutor’s breach of that promise makes the defendant’s plea constitutionally invalid. 
404 U.S. at 262–63. Subsequent cases indicate the defendant has legal remedies in this situation. 
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 580 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding broken promise 
by government in plea bargaining situation which results in entry of a plea of guilty in criminal 
proceeding may justify either setting aside plea of guilty or remand for purpose of compelling 
specific performance of government’s promise); United States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1126 n.4 
(8th Cir. 1977) (finding breach of a plea bargain itself by government may entitle defendant who 
has pleaded guilty in reliance on the bargain to withdrawing plea). 
 137 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (codifying plea-bargaining system); Confession, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a confession as an admission of guilt of a crime); Plea, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a guilty plea as in-court admission of hav-
ing committed charged offense); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow 
of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2467, 2469 (2004) (explaining situational risk factors in guilty 
plea context); Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 912–14 (explaining situational risk factors in con-
fession context); Allison D. Redlich et al., Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty 
Pleas Among Offenders with Mental Illness, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 79, 82 (2010) (explaining 
personal risk factors in both confession and guilty plea settings). 
 138 Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 912–14. 
 139 Compare United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804, 807–09 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding sus-
pect’s confession admissible despite officer exaggerating strength of evidence against suspect 
during interrogation), with United States v. Showalter, 569 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing defendant not allowed to withdraw guilty plea despite prosecutor exaggerating strength of 
evidence against defendant), and Bibas, supra note 137, at 2467, 2469 (arguing the common pro-
cess by which the prosecutor exaggerates the strength of the evidence against the defendant can 
induce a false guilty plea), and Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 912–14 (arguing the common 
process by which the interrogator exaggerates the strength of the evidence against the suspect can 
induce a false confession). 
 140 See F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the 
Innocent: the Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 
204 (2002) (explaining the rational decisionmaking process of defendants who falsely plead guilty 
under psychological pressure); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1001–77, 1117 (explaining rational 
decisionmaking process of suspects who falsely confess under psychological pressure). 
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powerful promise of leniency.141 A second shared situational risk factor is 
the veil of secrecy these manipulative pressures take place behind.142 When 
a suspect confesses, his entire interrogation is rarely videotaped.143 The se-
crecy in a plea agreement comes instead from the absence of a lengthy rec-
ord from trial, which can similarly conceal and prevent scrutiny of the fac-
tors that resulted in the defendant’s choice to plead guilty.144 And although 
the defendant has their own defense attorney to provide guidance during 
plea discussions, in some instances these attorneys have incentives to plead 
their clients guilty to stay on top of their burdensome caseloads.145 
Furthermore, the personal risk factors that give rise to false guilty 
pleas parallel those that result in false confessions.146 For example, juvenile 
or mentally ill defendants’ immaturity and poor decision-making skills can 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (explaining plea agreement procedure); Emily Rubin, Note, 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigm of Informed Consent, 80 
VA. L. REV. 1699, 1715–16 (1994) (arguing that there is coercion inherent in plea bargaining itself 
because both innocent and guilty suspects are tempted to accept offers rather than risk trial). 
 142 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 448 (1966) (referring to the problem of secrecy in 
police interrogations); Bibas, supra note 137, at 2493–96 (commenting on the secrecy in the plea 
agreement context). 
 143 Johnson, supra note 52, at 720. As of March 2019, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, 
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Caroli-
na, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation 
regarding the recording of custodial interrogations. False Confessions & Recording of Custodial 
Interrogations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/false-confessions-recording-
interrogations/ [https://perma.cc/TY54-JVBE]. State supreme courts have taken action in Alaska, 
Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. Id. Although state 
legislatures and state supreme courts have required videotaping, it is still rare that the entire inter-
rogation is recorded. GARRETT, supra note 35, at 28 (finding none of the interrogations of ex-
onerees who falsely confessed were recorded in their entirety). Furthermore, videotaping interro-
gations is only a reform when the interrogator is visible in the footage. False Confessions & Re-
cording of Custodial Interrogations, supra (finding when only the suspect is visible, jurors typi-
cally find the confession was not coerced, even when it is actually false because they cannot take 
the interrogator’s appearance into consideration). 
 144 See Bibas, supra note 137, at 2493–96 (analyzing innocent guilty pleaders’ lack of infor-
mation about the merits of their case in the absence of trial). For example, a defendant who choos-
es to plead guilty foregoes the opportunity to challenge any alleged eyewitnesses the prosecutor 
would have called at trial. See McCoy, supra note 127, at 71–72 (noting every guilty plea results 
in foregoing trial). 
 145 Rubin, supra note 141, at 1715–16 (arguing the incentives at play in a plea-bargaining 
system encourage poor representation). For private attorneys, plea bargaining can sometimes be a 
means to quickly dispose of cases to remain profitable. Hessick & Saujani, supra note 140, at 208. 
Although the income of public defenders, who are salaried employees of the state, does not de-
pend on the number of cases they dispose of, many of their jobs depend upon staying on top of an 
extraordinary number of cases every year. Id. at 209. 
 146 Allison D. Redlich, False Confessions, False Guilty Pleas: Similarities and Differences, in 
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POL-
ICY RECOMMENDATIONS 49, 60 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010). 
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influence their decision to accept plea offers despite their innocence.147 In-
nocence itself can also put defendants at risk for falsely pleading guilty, in 
part because innocent defendants do not have any firsthand knowledge of 
the crime or evidence against them.148 Ultimately, plea agreements have 
been widely criticized by scholars in the field for producing false confes-
sions for many of the same reasons that promises of leniency in interroga-
tions have been found to produce false confessions.149 
B. The Disparity in Treatment of Promise-Induced Admissions of Guilt 
1. Perception of Promise-Induced Guilty Pleas 
Despite their similarities, laypeople and actors within the criminal jus-
tice system are more open to conceding that the promises integral to plea 
agreements are coercive because such a concession does not invalidate the 
rationale behind using guilty pleas to convict.150 Whereas promise-induced 
confessions in interrogations ascertain their strength and legitimacy from the 
notion that an innocent suspect is unlikely to admit guilt, promise-induced 
guilty pleas in plea discussions are embraced as an economic necessity to 
alleviate overburdened criminal dockets.151 Therefore, despite misplaced 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Redlich et al., supra note 137, at 82 (studying 1,249 offenders with mental illness and 
concluding mental illness puts defendants at risk for false confessions and false guilty pleas); see 
Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 945–46, 952 (2010) (finding innocent juveniles more likely than inno-
cent adults to falsely confess or plead guilty). 
 148 Bibas, supra note 137, at 2494. In the absence of enough knowledge about the evidence 
against them, it is difficult for defendants to analyze whether a trial would be too great a risk, 
especially when the prosecutor exaggerated the evidence against them. Id. at 2467, 2469 (arguing 
the common process by which the prosecutor exaggerates the strength of the evidence against the 
defendant can induce a false guilty plea). 
 149 Redlich, supra note 146, at 60 (finding the mentally ill more vulnerable to false confes-
sions and false guilty pleas); Bibas, supra note 137, at 2467, 2469 (finding psychological coercion 
and innocence in plea discussions contributes to risk of false guilty plea); Drizin & Leo, supra 
note 13, at 912–14 (finding that psychological coercion in interrogations contributes to the risk of 
false confession); Kassin & Norwick, supra note 67, at 218 (explaining why actual innocence 
heightens risk of falsely confessing); Redlich, supra note 147, at 953 (finding juveniles, in com-
parison to adults, more vulnerable to false confessions and false guilty pleas). 
 150 See Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determin-
ing Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 894–95, 895 n.40 (1980) (explaining economic rationale behind 
the wide use and acceptance of plea bargaining). 
 151 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 233–51 (studying the public understanding of 
confession testimony); H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 105 (1977) (explaining economic necessity of guilty plea system). The 
notion that innocent suspects do not confess is fostered by the public’s inability to detect, compre-
hend, and properly weigh such promises. See Kassin, supra note 15, at 228–29 (commenting on 
the general population’s inability to understand the coercive effects associated with promises of 
leniency in interrogation setting); Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 234 (finding that direct 
promises are more often excluded than implied promises because they are easier to identify); Kas-
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trust in promises of leniency to elicit truthful confessions, people can be 
more openly skeptical of our system’s reliance on promises of leniency to 
elicit truthful guilty pleas.152 
And although they interact with many of the same other situational and 
personal risk factors, promises of leniency made during plea discussions are 
easier to detect and their psychological effects are easier to understand.153 
Promises of leniency made during plea discussions may be easier to detect 
because they are made explicitly in open court and are legally enforcea-
ble.154 Additionally, most people versed in criminal law have an elementary 
understanding that because of the discrepancies between possible punish-
ments under sentencing schemes in the United States, prosecutors’ offers 
are inherently coercive to any rational defendant who calculates how much 
he wants to risk.155 
Studies show the public’s understanding of the coercive nature of 
promises in plea bargaining, as well as other commonly held beliefs, have 
actually led many to view plea bargaining with suspicion and distaste in 
striking contrast to their inability to detect, comprehend, and properly weigh 
                                                                                                                           
sin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 82–85 (remarking on the difficulty in discounting confes-
sions induced by promises of leniency). Plea bargaining is instead justified in economic terms. See 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970) 
(noting that criminal justice system costs would double if guilty pleas were reduced to making up 
80% of all criminal cases, and costs would triple if they were reduced to 70%); Uviller, supra, at 
105 (explaining economic costs of trial require guilty pleas to make up at least ninety percent of 
all criminal cases). 
 152 Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining, 32 CRIM. 
L.Q. 85, 95 (1989) (using a Gallup poll to test public attitudes in Canada and finding that most 
Canadians disapprove of plea bargaining); Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Crimi-
nal Justice, 16 CRIME & JUST. 99, 149 (1992) (discussing studies that have shown that most 
Americans and Canadians disapprove of plea bargaining). The public is simultaneously concerned 
that the plea-bargaining system punishes the innocent and lets the guilty off too lightly. See Patri-
cia A. Payne, Plea Bargaining: A Necessary Evil?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 
232, 232 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1994) (describing common public concerns regarding plea bar-
gaining). 
 153 Kari Lindberg, More People Are Pleading Guilty to Crimes They Didn’t Commit, So How 
Can We Stop It?, REWIRE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://rewire.news/article/2017/02/08/people-pleading-
guilty-crimes-didnt-commit-can-stop/ [https://perma.cc/JM82-9HP5] (commenting on the public 
awareness of false guilty pleas). 
 154 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (stating that the terms of a plea agreement must be recited in 
open court); see supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining the availability of a legal rem-
edy for the government’s breach of a plea agreement). 
 155 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably 
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1342, 1346 (1997) (explaining public under-
standing that an innocent and rational defendant may plead guilty to receive a lesser sentence 
rather than risk the greater sentence that would accompany erroneous conviction); Lindberg, supra 
note 153 (finding popular culture has helped raised public awareness of innocent people who have 
taken guilty pleas). 
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promises in interrogations.156 Demands for reform have been fierce, and 
some critics even call for removal of the plea bargaining system entirely.157 
2. Stricter Constraints on Plea Bargaining  
Because of the distaste that arises from a better understanding and 
willingness to acknowledge the coercive nature of promises in the plea dis-
cussion context, defendants who plead guilty after being promised leniency 
in plea discussions are afforded greater procedural safeguards than suspects 
who confess after being promised leniency in interrogations.158 In essence, 
defendants susceptible to similar situational and personal risk factors who 
are induced by a promise of leniency to admit to a crime they did not com-
mit receive disparate treatment in our criminal justice system.159 
The chief procedural safeguard afforded to defendants who choose to 
plead guilty is the requirement that their plea is knowing and intelligent, 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Cohen & Doob, supra note 152, at 95 (using a Gallup Poll to expose the common 
skepticism of our system’s reliance on promises of leniency to elicit truthful guilty pleas); Payne, 
supra note 152, at 232 (describing common public concerns regarding plea bargaining including 
that it sometimes punishes the innocent); Roberts, supra note 152, at 149 (discussing studies that 
have shown that most Americans and Canadians do not support plea bargaining); see also supra 
note 152 and accompanying text (explaining the common skepticism of our system’s reliance on 
promises of leniency to elicit truthful guilty pleas). 
 157 See generally Milton Heumann & Colin Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition 
of Plea Bargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 393 (1979) (stud-
ying the potential consequences abolishing plea bargaining would have on firearm statute); Otwin 
Marenin, The State of Plea Bargaining in Alaska, ALASKA JUST. F., Spring 1990, at 1, 1 (studying 
the effect of the Alaska Attorney General’s partial ban on plea agreements in 1975); Michael L. 
Rubinstein & Teresa J. White, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 367 (1979) 
(studying Alaska’s partial ban on plea bargaining); Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea 
Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265 (1987) (studying 
abolition of plea bargaining in a Texas county). 
 158 Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (holding that prior to any custodial interrogation, the 
person must be sufficiently warned of their rights), and Schulhofer, supra note 75, at 867–69 (ana-
lyzing development of Supreme Court’s due process “voluntariness” test that prevents the admis-
sion of involuntary confessions at trial), and supra notes 103–125 (explaining safeguards for de-
fendants who confess), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (governing required contents of plea collo-
quy between judge and defendant before guilty plea is accepted), and Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding guilty pleas and accompanying waivers of constitutional rights 
must be “voluntary” and “knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences”), and infra notes 160–172 (explaining stricter safeguards 
for defendants who plead guilty). 
 159 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (holding guilty pleas must be “voluntary” and “knowing, intel-
ligent acts done with sufficient awareness of relevant circumstances and likely consequences”); 
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding a confession must be voluntary to be 
admissible under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which requires state action to 
be “consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice”); see also supra notes 103–
125 (explaining safeguards for defendants who confess); infra notes 160–172 (explaining stricter 
safeguards for defendants who plead guilty). 
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voluntary, and based in fact.160 First, a knowing and intelligent agreement is 
one in which the defendant understands the charge, the possible sentences, 
and the rights waived as a result of the accepted plea.161 In order to under-
stand the charge, the defendant must also comprehend its material ele-
ments.162 Understanding the consequences of the plea entails the defend-
ant’s full comprehension of the minimum and maximum sentences as well 
as applicable sentencing guidelines that the judge might be required to 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (governing required contents of plea colloquy between 
judge and defendant before guilty plea is accepted); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (holding guilty pleas 
and accompanying waivers of constitutional rights must be “voluntary” and “knowing, intelligent 
acts done with sufficient awareness of relevant circumstances and likely consequences”); Boykin, 
395 U.S. at 242 (holding trial judge’s acceptance of petitioner’s guilty plea without affirmative 
showing that it was intelligent and voluntary was erroneous). Because a guilty plea will generally 
operate as a waiver of several constitutional rights, the standard for a waiver is concomitant with 
the standard for accepting a plea of guilty. See, e.g., United States. v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 355 
(4th Cir. 2012) (refusing to enforce an appeal waiver where defendant was incorrectly told both in 
his plea agreement and at his plea hearing that he faced only a ten-year sentence because the mis-
information prevented the waiver from being a “knowing” one); United States v. Manigan, 592 
F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding appellate waiver was valid where the defendant voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently agreed to it); Scott, 419 F.2d at 274 (holding guilty plea and accom-
panying waiver of constitutional rights must be voluntary, knowing and understanding). Essential-
ly, by entering a plea of guilty, a defendant waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to constitu-
tionality of the conviction, and only an attack on voluntary and knowing nature of plea can be 
sustained. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62–63 n.2 (1975) (reasoning that guilty pleas 
establish reliable admission of factual guilt, and thus make any constitutional violations regarding 
factual guilt irrelevant). 
 161 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (holding guilty pleas must be knowing and intelligent); McCoy 
& Mirra, supra note 150, at 899 (explaining due process concerns in admissibility of a knowing 
and intelligent guilty plea). 
 162 See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618, 626 (holding that a plea is intelligent if the defendant re-
ceives “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him”); see, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 
545 U.S. 175, 182–83 (2005) (holding a plea was knowing despite defendant’s post-sentencing 
claim he did not understand specific intent requirement for aggravated murder because at plea 
hearing defense attorneys represented they explained elements of charge and defendant confirmed 
this was true); United States v. McMullin, 568 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that a plea 
was knowing despite defendant’s claim he would not have plead guilty upon realizing the defini-
tion of “unlawful user” because the court clearly explained elements of offenses); In re Sealed 
Case, 283 F.3d 349, 354–55 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding a plea knowing despite the trial court’s 
failure to explain every element of the crime because the court informed defendant of straightfor-
ward conspiracy charge, counsel advised him throughout, and defendant used term “conspired” in 
court). But see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 638, 647 (1976) (holding defendant’s guilty 
plea to second degree murder involuntary because he did not receive adequate explanation of the 
crime’s “critical” mens rea requirement); United States v. Bradley, 381 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 
2004) (plea not intelligent if everyone involved misunderstood nature of charges); United States v. 
Villalobos, 333 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding plea not intelligent because defend-
ant was not informed drug quantity had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt). The requirement 
that a defendant comprehend the critical elements of the charged crime is intended to ensure that 
the defendant knows what facts the government will have to prove if he pleads not guilty and thus 
can make a fully informed decision as to whether he would be better off accepting the agreement 
or going to trial in hopes the government cannot prove those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 
United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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abide by.163 Finally, the defendant must comprehend the rights waived as a 
result of accepting a plea, which are different than the rights denied as a 
result of conviction.164 For example, the loss of the right to vote in some 
states is not directly related to pleading guilty, but instead a consequence of 
being convicted of a serious crime.165 
Second, a voluntary plea is one that is not coerced by the state.166 A 
plea may be considered involuntary if it is the result of either psychological 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See, e.g., Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2000) (plea was knowing de-
spite the defendant’s belief that his state and federal sentences would run concurrently because the 
defendant was informed his agreement was binding only on the state court); United States v. Kel-
lum, 42 F.3d 1087, 1097 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding cocaine distribution conspirator’s guilty plea 
was knowing and voluntary in part because court reviewed the consequences of his guilty plea 
including possible minimum and maximum penalties); Richardson v. United States, 577 F.2d 447, 
452 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding a defendant’s guilty plea to conspiracy in a drug related offense was 
knowing in part because he was advised that possible maximum consequence of guilty plea would 
be imprisonment for 15 years followed by a minimum special parole term of three years). But see, 
e.g., United States v. Castro-Gómez, 233 F.3d 684, 687 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding plea not knowing 
because defendant was not informed he faced mandatory life sentence). 
 164 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N); see, e.g., Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 51 (1995) 
(holding defendant’s guilty plea was knowing because defendant acknowledged that he waived 
various constitutional rights, including right to jury trial on forfeiture issue); United States v. Ed-
gar, 348 F.3d 867, 872 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding defendant’s guilty plea to unlawful possession of 
a firearm was knowing and voluntary in part because his signed agreement expressly stated he had 
discussed with counsel his waiver of the right to appeal or challenge collaterally his conviction or 
sentence). But see Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 799 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding plea was not 
knowing because court failed to explicitly inform defendant he was giving up right to trial); Unit-
ed States v. Robinson, 187 F.3d 516, 517–18 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474, 
482–84 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). 
 165 Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/
Q4GN-BJZX]. 
 166 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (holding guilty plea invalid if induced by promises or threats which 
deprive the plea of its voluntariness); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) 
(same). The voluntariness standard in the plea-bargaining context has been characterized as “ex-
ceedingly ambiguous” and different than voluntariness standards in other contexts. Brandon L. 
Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1415, 1425 (2016) 
(noting the voluntariness analysis in plea bargain context is different than in confession context in 
part because the Supreme Court recognizes the threat of punishment in interrogations as coercive, 
but does not find the inherent threat of more severe punishment post-trial as coercive); Loftus E. 
Becker, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 760–72 (1988) (argu-
ing Supreme Court’s cases on voluntariness in the guilty plea context are ambiguous and never 
fully developed the prohibition on government inducements likely to cause innocent defendants to 
plead guilty). For example, threatening a suspect with a harsher sentence during an interrogation is 
treated differently than giving the same threat during plea bargaining. See Garrett, supra, at 1425 
(providing examples of how the voluntariness standard differs in the plea discussion context from 
the interrogation context). Furthermore, in Kercheval v. United States, the first Supreme Court 
case to address the standards governing guilty pleas, the Supreme Court failed to even mention 
Bram v. United States, the then leading case on coerced confessions. See generally Kercheval v. 
United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (failing to cite Bram v. United States while discussing coerced 
confessions); see also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (deciding how to treat 
coerced confessions in the first instance). 
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or physical pressure and therefore the defendant must confirm the absence 
of coercion.167 Lastly, the requirement that a plea agreement is based in fact 
means it must be premised on conduct that actually took place and serves as 
a theoretical prohibition against defendants pleading guilty to crimes they 
did not commit.168 This requirement ensures that defendants are not pun-
ished in the absence of culpability.169 
Secondary procedural safeguards intended to prevent false guilty pleas 
include the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.170 Defendants may also set 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 746 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding defendant’s 
guilty plea was voluntary in part because he stated he had not been forced, threatened, coerced, or 
intimidated into pleading guilty). Where a guilty plea is the result of threats causing the defendant 
a justified fear of harm to himself and family, his plea may be involuntary. United States v. Col-
son, 230 F. Supp. 953, 958–60 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Promises of leniency to a third party do not per 
se render a plea involuntary. United States v. Spilmon, 454 F.3d 657, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding plea voluntary because agreement exempting defendant’s wife from prosecution not 
unduly coercive); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding plea 
voluntary despite promise not to prosecute defendant’s wife if he plead guilty because defendant’s 
statements indicated plea entered for other reasons); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119 
(4th Cir. 1991) (plea voluntary despite defendant’s wife being promised leniency as part of plea). 
But see, e.g., United States v. Abbott, 241 F.3d 29, 34–35, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (plea not voluntary 
where linked to favorable plea agreement for defendant’s mother because government failed to 
bring linked pleas to judge’s attention and judge could therefore not adequately decide whether 
defendant plead guilty voluntarily or to save mother). But because suspects generally plead guilty 
with the expectancy of receiving more lenient treatment than the worst post-trial outcome, this 
promise alone is typically not enough to make the plea involuntary. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 128, § 180 (explaining prosecutors have substantial discretion in determining contents of plea 
agreements); see also United States v. Araiza, 693 F.2d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding induce-
ment to plead guilty based on the terms of the plea agreement itself does not render the plea invol-
untary or coerced). 
 168 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(f); see United States v. Alber, 56 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing the factual basis requirement does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather that 
it is met when there is reasonable basis to conclude each of the elements in the charge has been 
met); see, e.g., United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding factual basis 
established for defendant’s plea of guilty to charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine because he 
admitted to receiving phone calls from buyers and helping his co-conspirators “achieve their 
goals”); United States v. Montoya-Camacho, 644 F.2d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding adequate 
factual basis existed for defendant’s guilty plea to charge of conspiracy to transport aliens illegally 
within United States because he admitted he knew he was helping aliens cross the Rio Grande 
river in violation of the law). But see Alessi v. United States, 593 F.2d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(holding insufficient factual basis for accepting petitioner’s pleas of guilty to charging income tax 
evasion where there was no showing that the Government could prove concealment). 
 169 See United States v. Romanello, 425 F. Supp. 304, 309 (D. Conn. 1975) (noting actual 
basis requirement is intended to prevent false pleas, rather than involuntary ones, and thus does 
not affect the voluntary analysis). 
 170 See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169–70 (declaring right to effective assistance of counsel during 
plea bargaining in a case involving assault with intent to murder); Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (declaring 
right to effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining in a case involving repeatedly driv-
ing with a revoked license). It is immaterial whether the defendant later loses at trial. Lafler, 566 
U.S. at 169; Frye, 566 U.S. at 138–40. In Frye, the defendant was charged with the felony of re-
peatedly driving with a revoked license and the prosecution sent his defense counsel two plea 
bargain offers. 566 U.S. at 138–40. The defendant’s counsel never told him about the offers and 
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aside their guilty plea as involuntary if they were prejudiced by prosecutori-
al misconduct.171 Lastly, a defendant who enters into plea discussions but 
                                                                                                                           
he subsequently plead guilty without an underlying offer and was sentenced to three years in pris-
on. Id. The Supreme Court vacated his conviction and remanded after finding defense counsel had 
the duty to communicate plea offers from the prosecution that may benefit the accused, and the 
defendant’s counsel was deficient for failing to do so. Id. at 149–51. In Lafler, the defendant was 
charged with several offenses, including assault with intent to murder, and rejected a guilty plea 
based on the advice of his defense counsel. 566 U.S. at 161. The Supreme Court reviewed his 
petition for habeas corpus and held he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in advis-
ing him to reject the plea offer and go to trial, and the proper remedy was ordering the State to 
reoffer the plea agreement. Id. at 174. Now, a defendant may seek to undo a guilty plea and result-
ing conviction by claiming he received poor legal representation during the plea bargain process. 
See generally id. (holding a defendant may seek to undo a guilty plea and resulting conviction for 
inefficient assistance of counsel); Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (holding defendant entitled to State reoffer-
ing plea agreement to remedy counsel’s deficient performance in advising him to reject plea of-
fer); see also United States v. Batamula, 788 F.3d 166, 171–72 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d en banc, 823 
F.3d 237 (2016) (remarking “providing counsel to assist a defendant in deciding whether to plead 
guilty is [o]ne of the most precious applications of the Sixth Amendment”). When a convicted 
defendant challenges his guilty plea on the grounds that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel, he must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and he must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense by showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (articulating ineffective assistance of counsel standard); United 
States v. Weeks, 653 F.3d 1188, 1201 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because counsel failed to properly advise him that lack of intent provided a 
valid defense to conspiracy charge). But see United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835–36 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (holding defendant received effective assistance of counsel absent proof that but for 
counsel’s erroneous estimate of applicable Sentencing Guidelines, defendant would have pursued 
trial because he was warned of statutory maximum). 
 171 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. Prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to render a guilty plea involun-
tary includes a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence or misrepresentation of plea 
bargaining procedure. See id. (holding prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence vio-
lates Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process and a fair trial); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 453–54 (1995) (finding the question of whether a failure to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence prevented a fair trial depends not on whether the state would have had a case to go to the 
jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether the jury’s verdict would have been the 
same); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding evidence withheld by govern-
ment is “material,” as would require reversal of conviction, if there is reasonable probability that, 
had evidence been disclosed to defense, result of proceeding would have been different); see, e.g., 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (holding prosecutor’s nondisclosure of 
promise to key witness violated due process and required new trial); Ferrara v. United States, 456 
F.3d 278, 297–98 (1st Cir. 2006) (setting aside the verdict and vacating the sentence because there 
was reasonable evidence defendant would have opted for trial if prosecution had not withheld 
exculpatory evidence); United States v. Reyes, 313 F.3d 1152, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2002) (Allowing 
defendants to withdraw pleas because prosecutor led them to believe pleas could be withdrawn if 
court did not follow recommended sentencing range); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1321–22 
(2d Cir. 1988) (allowing defendant to challenge voluntariness of plea because prosecution with-
held material exculpatory evidence that another person was seen near victims and arrested for 
assault). But see United States v. Kates, 174 F.3d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding 
that a defendant was not allowed to challenge a plea as involuntary even though the government 
knew that a potential witness had changed their story and failed to disclose it because the testimo-
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later decides to go to trial is shielded by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(f), which ostensibly renders most statements made by an accused during 
plea negotiations with the prosecutor inadmissible.172 
III. A PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION ON PROMISE-INDUCED CONFESSIONS 
The parallels between the risk factors that heighten the chance of a 
wrongful conviction in both interrogation and plea discussion settings, includ-
ing promises of leniency, demand certain reforms should be enacted in the 
interrogation setting.173 Section A of this Part advocates that there should be 
equivalent safeguards for the suspect who confesses and defendant who 
                                                                                                                           
ny was neither material nor exculpatory); United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 258 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding defendant not allowed to challenge plea as involuntary despite government’s fail-
ure to produce evidence key witness had perjured himself at other trials because such evidence not 
material to prosecution of defendant); Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 705 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a defendant was not allowed to challenge plea as involuntary even though the gov-
ernment had allegedly withheld exculpatory books and records from the defendant’s own compa-
ny because the defendant was presumably familiar with the materials and the defendant’s state-
ments at a plea hearing established guilt); United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1512 (1st Cir. 
1989), abrogated on other grounds by Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012) (holding 
defendant not allowed to challenge state court guilty plea as involuntary because state prosecutor’s 
failure to disclose existence of ongoing federal investigation not misrepresentation). 
 172 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f); FED. R. EVID. 410. Rule 11(f) sets forth the circumstances under 
which pleas, offers of pleas, and related statements are admissible against a defendant at trial by 
simply referring to Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f); FED. R. 
EVID. 410. Rule 410 regarding pleas, plea discussions, and related statements states:  
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not ad-
missible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea discus-
sions: (1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn; (2) a nolo contendere plea; (3) a 
statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or (4) a statement made 
during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discus-
sions did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea. 
(b) Exceptions. The court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3) or (4): 
(1) in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same plea or plea 
discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements ought to be considered 
together; or (2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement, if the defend-
ant made the statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel present.  
FED. R. EVID. 411. The Notes of the Advisory Committee suggest that admitting a defendant’s 
withdrawn guilty plea would produce a dilemma inconsistent with allowing the defendant a trial. 
FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule. For instance, admitting a 
withdrawn guilty plea might compel the defendant to take the stand to explain it, thereby allowing 
the prosecution to call the lawyer who represented the defendant when he or she entered the plea. 
Id. 
 173 See Bibas, supra note 137, at 2467, 2469 (explaining situational risk factors in guilty plea 
context); Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 912–14 (explaining situational risk factors in confession 
context); Redlich et al., supra note 137, at 82 (explaining personal risk factors in both confession 
and guilty plea settings). 
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pleads guilty in response to a promise.174 Section B of this Part provides the 
content of a potential jury instruction that could protect against jurors’ erro-
neous convictions based on false confession testimony by preventing jurors 
from giving promise-induced confessions undue weight.175 Section C of this 
Part examines how this instruction would have affected the trial of an ex-
oneree who falsely confessed after being promised he could go home if he 
did so.176 
A. Closing the Gap Between Different Procedural Safeguards Governing 
Promise-Induced Admissions of Guilt 
Because our criminal justice system has openly acknowledged that 
promises of leniency are coercive in plea discussions where it is easier to 
detect their presence and understand their effect, it should also be acknowl-
edged that they are similarly coercive in interrogations now that their pres-
ence and effect has been revealed by review of common interrogation pro-
cedures and relevant psychology.177 Taking promises of leniency seriously 
in both contexts means providing equivalent safeguards to prevent wrongful 
conviction in either scenario.178 Because cases that involve confessions, 
unlike those involving a guilty plea, leave open possibility of trial, there are 
even greater opportunities to implement meaningful procedural safeguards 
for the former.179 Typically, when evidence is somewhat counter-intuitive, 
expert testimony and jury instructions can be employed to aid the fact find-
er.180 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See infra notes 177–198 and accompanying text. 
 175 See infra notes 199–214 and accompanying text. 
 176 See infra notes 215–231 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 82–85 (remarking on the misplaced trust in 
confessions induced by promises of leniency); Kassin, supra note 15, at 228–29 (explaining that 
the general population cannot fathom the coercive effects associated with promises of leniency in 
interrogation setting); McCoy & Mirra, supra note 150, at 894–95, 895 n.40 (offering an econom-
ic rationale for why people are freer to concede that the promises integral to plea agreements are 
coercive). 
 178 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 996 (arguing that illuminating the risk of wrongful 
conviction that false confessions impose on the innocent ought to incite demands for reform). 
 179 See McCoy, supra note 127 (noting every guilty plea results in foregoing trial). See gener-
ally BODENHAMER, supra note 129 (providing a history of defendants’ rights at trial in state and 
federal courts). 
 180 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (interpreting FED. R. 
EVID. 702 with respect to admissibility of expert testimony); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–53 (1999) (extending Daubert’s holding to all expert testimony and 
other specialized knowledge); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–43 (1997) (holding 
rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony will be reviewed for abuse of discretion). In 1993, 
the Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., ruled that, under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 (Rule 702), a trial judge must make a preliminary assessment of whether an 
expert’s scientific testimony is based on reasoning or methodology that is scientifically valid and 
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1. Inadequacy of Expert Testimony on Promises of Leniency 
Unfortunately, expert testimony’s usefulness in helping jurors better 
evaluate false confession evidence is accompanied by a myriad of disad-
vantages.181 Many state and federal courts still exclude expert testimony on 
false confessions.182 Even when experts are allowed to testify, some courts 
limit their testimony to the general phenomenon of false confessions or the 
                                                                                                                           
can properly be applied to the facts at issue. FED. R. EVID. 702; 509 U.S. at 588. Rule 702 was 
amended in 2000 to incorporate the holding in Daubert and has been amended several additional 
times since. See FED. R. EVID. 702. The rule now provides:  
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s sci-
entific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on suf-
ficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and meth-
ods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 
the case.  
Id. Limiting jury instructions are instead governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which states: 
“If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose—but not against 
another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its 
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” FED. R. EVID. 105. Once evidence is ruled admis-
sible, the jury may require instructions to further guide their evaluation of such evidence to ensure 
the jury only considers evidence for relevant purposes but not for impermissible reasons, to inform 
the jury how particular evidence may be considered or mitigate the prejudicial impact of evidence 
more generally. See id. advisory committee notes to 1972 proposed rule (explaining the intended 
purpose of Rule 105); see, e.g., United States v. Tail, 459 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that an instruction advising the jury that evidence of prior conviction was received for the limited 
purpose of impeachment decreased any danger of unfair prejudice); United States v. Kennard, 472 
F.3d 851, 855, 859 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that a jury instruction was properly given to guide 
jury’s consideration of evidence of post-indictment flight in criminal fraud trial to avoid unfair 
prejudice to defendant); United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 363 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing 
that when a sequestration order has been violated the jury may be instructed that they may consid-
er the violation toward the issue of credibility). 
 181 See Chojnacki et al., supra note 112, at 39 (arguing empirical analysis demonstrates expert 
testimony on false confessions enhances jurors’ ability to evaluate a defendant’s confession by 
educating them about scientific research that goes beyond their common knowledge); Slobogin, 
supra note 112, at 108 (arguing expert testimony on false confessions assumes we can know 
things objectively, which has negative impact on criminal defendants by undermining their de-
fenses); see also infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text (explaining state and federal courts’ 
positions on the admissibility of expert testimony on false confessions). 
 182 See United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that expert 
testimony regarding false confession was properly excluded because it infringed on the jury’s role 
in making credibility determinations); Vent v. State, 67 P.3d 661, 670 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding that expert testimony on the subject of false confessions was properly excluded because 
the science behind it can be unreliable); State v. Cobb, 43 P.3d 855, 869 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) 
(finding expert testimony on false confessions properly excluded because it infringes on the jury’s 
role); State v. Davis, 32 S.W.3d 603, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (finding expert testimony was 
properly excluded because the common knowledge of the jury regarding false confessions was 
reasonable and unaided by expert opinions); People v. Philips, 692 N.Y.S.2d 915, 939–40 (Sup. 
Ct. 1999) (finding that the exclusion of an expert witness on interrogation techniques and volun-
tariness was inadmissible because discussion of detectives’ investigation was speculative). 
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defendant’s mental condition, rather than a full explanation of all the relevant 
factors of a false confession present in the particular defendant’s confes-
sion.183 These court decisions mean that experts may not be allowed to testify 
about the role of promises of leniency in inducing false confessions, even 
where a promise was made to the particular defendant and even though their 
coercive effect falls outside the knowledge of most jurors.184 Lastly, most 
criminal defendants are indigent and cannot afford expert testimony.185 No-
tably, only eight percent of exonerees who falsely confessed were able to 
use expert testimony at trial.186 
2. Jury Instructions on Promises of Leniency 
In contrast to expert testimony, jury instructions are more widely ac-
cepted, less expensive, and can still illuminate how promises of leniency 
often produce false confessions in ways that contradict jurors’ common un-
derstandings.187 Studies show, however, that jury instructions only reduce 
the rate of conviction when founded on scientific research.188 The use of 
instructions that are not founded on science may reduce perceptions of vol-
                                                                                                                           
 183 See United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1344–45 (7th Cir. 1996) (only permitting expert 
to testify about false confessions generally); United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 129, 132–33 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (only permitting expert to testify that defendant suffered from mental disorder which 
caused him to tell grandiose, self-incriminating lies). 
 184 See Hall, 93 F.3d at 1344–45 (excluding expert testimony beyond general explanation of 
false confessions); Shay, 57 F.3d at 126 (excluding expert testimony beyond explanation of sus-
pect’s mental disorder); Kassin, supra note 15, at 221, 228 (finding general population incapable 
of understanding the coercive effects associated with promises of leniency in interrogation set-
ting); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 316 (finding prospective jurors fail to understand 
the strength of promises of leniency in coercing suspects to confess). 
 185 See GARRETT, supra note 35, at 40 (explaining that judges often deny indigent defendants 
the funds to hire experts or rule expert testimony on false confessions altogether inadmissible); 
SMITH & DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that a majority of state and federal prison in-
mates were indigent at the time of their trials). In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that 
an indigent defendant has a constitutional due process right to assistance by an expert witness only 
if its denial would deprive the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial. 470 U.S. 68, 82–83 (1985); 
see Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1312–13 (noting that judges have the ability to restrict or deny 
funding for defense experts). 
 186 GARRETT, supra note 35, at 40. 
 187 See generally Jones & Penrod, supra note 113 (finding research-based instructions on 
coercive interrogation techniques may be an effective safeguard against the use of potentially 
unreliable confession evidence); see also Gomes et al., supra note 113, at 321 (finding jury in-
struction on credibility of confessions reduces guilty verdicts); Kassin & Neumann, supra note 16, 
at 481 (finding jurors’ common understandings lead them to place more weight on confession 
evidence than eyewitness or character evidence regardless of its truth or falsity); Sheehan, supra 
note 113, at 674 (arguing that supplanting expert testimony with jury instructions can reduce the 
time and cost of a trial in the context of eyewitness identifications). 
 188 See generally Jones & Penrod, supra note 113 (finding instructions based on psychological 
research can influences jurors’ verdicts, but instructions without the same foundation merely cause 
skepticism). 
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untariness, but are unable to influence jurors’ verdicts.189 For example, in-
structions concerning the credibility of the defendant and the police appear 
ineffective.190 Instructions without a basis in scientific research have similarly 
fallen short when they focused on voluntariness, reliability, or fairness.191 On 
the other hand, research supports the efficacy of using social science-based 
jury instructions regarding personal and situational risk factors to safeguard 
against wrongful convictions instigated by false confession testimony at 
trial.192 
A sufficient jury instruction designed to prevent wrongful convictions 
in false confession cases must help the jury detect, comprehend, and proper-
ly weigh whether the confession was coerced by a promise of leniency. 193 
The instruction should begin by putting promises of leniency in context by 
explaining they are part of a larger scheme of interdependent situational and 
personal risk factors.194 Next, the jury should be given tools to identify both 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Gomes et al., supra note 113, at 319 (finding a high rate of conviction was only re-
duced when participants received scientific information rather than credibility instructions without 
scientific basis); see also Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 92, at 82–83 (finding jury instruction 
prompted jurors to judge confessions involuntary, but nonetheless return guilty verdicts). 
 190 See Gomes et al., supra note 113, at 319, 323 (finding high rate of conviction not reduced 
by credibility instruction regarding defendant and police). 
 191 See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 92 (finding instructions on voluntariness, reliability, 
or fairness reduce perceptions of voluntariness but do not reduce conviction rate); supra notes 91–
94 and accompanying text (explaining that even when people find confessions produced by prom-
ises of leniency to be involuntary with the help of a voluntariness instruction, they still improperly 
rely on that confession in reaching a verdict). 
 192 See generally Jones & Penrod, supra note 113 (finding science-based instructions on false 
confessions influence jurors’ verdicts). Support for science-based instructions to increase jurors’ 
sensitivity to the quality of interrogation procedures has been paralleled in researchers’ attempts to 
increase jurors’ sensitivity to the quality of identification procedures in cases with eyewitness 
testimony. See Pawlenko et al., supra note 113, at 195 (finding educating jurors about eyewitness 
identification based on scientific research increases the likelihood of a guilty verdict when quality 
is high and decreases the likelihood when quality is low). These laboratory results have been rep-
licated in court after the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in State v. Henderson that jurors in all 
cases involving eyewitness evidence must receive instructions intended to assist jurors in evaluat-
ing witnessing and identification conditions. See 27 A.3d 872, 925–26 (N.J. 2011) (mandating 
eyewitness identification jury instructions that educate the jury on system and estimator variables 
that the court has found scientific support for that is generally accepted by experts in the field). 
See generally Jones & Penrod, supra note 113 (finding Henderson juror instructions on eyewit-
ness identification based on scientific research enhances jurors’ skepticism of eyewitness testimo-
ny). 
 193 See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 83–94 (explaining jurors’ difficulty in dis-
counting confessions induced by promises of leniency); Kassin, supra note 15, at 228–29 (com-
menting on the general population’s inability to understand the coercive effects associated with 
promises of leniency); Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 234 (finding direct promises were 
more often excluded than implied promises because they are easier to identify); see also supra 
notes 70–102 and accompanying text (explaining the strong influence promise-induced confes-
sions have in the courtroom on jurors’ verdicts). 
 194 See Gudjonsson, supra note 65 (arguing that there are typically four types of psychological 
vulnerabilities relevant to the evaluation of suspects in criminal cases); Kassin & Gudjonsson, 
2019] Promise-Induced False Confessions 1681 
express and implied promises in interrogation settings and explain permit-
ted inferences in the absence of a video recording.195 Once the instruction 
fully enables the jury to identify explicit and implicit promises of leniency 
and to understand that they are functionally equivalent, it should explain the 
relevant psychological science to illuminate how promises of leniency can 
coerce a false confession.196 Lastly, the jury should be given the tools to 
weigh the promise of leniency in discounting the reliability of the confes-
sion.197 A jury instruction, if properly written, could ultimately prevent peo-
ple who are not versed in false confession research from giving dispropor-
tionate weight to unreliable confessions and serve as a safeguard against 
grave miscarriages of justice.198 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 32, at 36 (scrutinizing the interrogation methods commonly employed by officers); Leo 
& Davis, supra note 32, at 20 (explaining the stages of false confessions in the criminal justice 
system); Redlich & Goodman, supra note 66, at 151–53 (arguing that youth are more susceptible 
to making false confessions); see also supra notes 50–69 and accompanying text (explaining that 
false confessions are generally a product of unduly coercive techniques used by law enforcement 
and personal attributes that increase a suspect’s vulnerability to such pressure). 
 195 See Johnson, supra note 52, at 720 (explaining the challenges faced by a criminal defense 
attorney in defending a client’s reliability); Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 235, 248 (studying 
the impact of implied promises and threats on suspects’ decision to falsely confess as well as on 
juror’s verdicts); Leo et al., supra note 68, at 530 (explaining the commonplace credibility battle 
between a defendant and officer over what was said during an interrogation). 
 196 See Leo & Davis, supra note 32, at 35 (arguing that suspects give serious weight to an 
interrogator’s promises of leniency because they think interrogators have superior knowledge and 
experience concerning the consequences of confessing); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1001–77 
(explaining that according to rational choice theory, the combination of perceived limited options 
and consequences, including consequences from promises of leniency, result in suspects’ deci-
sions that it is more beneficial to confess than maintain innocence); see also supra notes 53–62 
and accompanying text (explaining that the implementation of psychological interrogation tech-
niques, including making promises of leniency, can heighten the risk of a false confession). 
 197 See United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that the jury 
may independently assess the proper weight to attribute to a confession); Kassin & Wrightsman, 
supra note 92 (finding juries struggle to properly discount confessions in reaching a verdict); Leo 
et al., supra note 68, at 531 (arguing for a reliability test for the admission of confessions); see 
also supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text (explaining that even when people find confes-
sions produced by promises of leniency to be involuntary with the help of a voluntariness instruc-
tion, they still improperly rely on that confession in reaching a verdict). 
 198 See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 87 (finding mock jurors frequently return 
guilty verdicts despite a confession’s falsity in the absence of an instruction that explains the situa-
tional and personal risk factors); Kassin & Neumann, supra note 16, at 82–83 (conducting mock 
jury studies to evaluate the comparative impact of confession evidence and finding confession 
evidence raised the conviction rate more than eyewitness testimony or character evidence). See 
generally Jones & Penrod, supra note 113 (finding research-based instructions on coercive inter-
rogation techniques may be an effective safeguard against the use of potentially unreliable confes-
sion evidence). 
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B. The Content of a Jury Instruction on Promises of  
Leniency in Interrogations 
The following jury instruction is intended to mitigate the chance of a 
wrongful conviction by educating the jury about how to properly detect, 
comprehend, and weigh promises of leniency when deciding whether a con-
fession is reliable.199 Because it is not intended to address issues of volun-
tariness in their own right, the instruction should be preceded by a reminder 
that in order to even consider the confession in deliberation, the state must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were in fact made, and 
that they were made voluntarily.200 
The skeleton of a model jury instruction on promises of leniency 
should resemble the following: “Research has shown that there are two 
types of risk factors for false confessions: the interrogation tactics used by 
the police (situational risk factors), and the suspect’s vulnerabilities (per-
sonal risk factors).201 Therefore, to determine whether the defendant’s 
statements were reliable, you should consider the following: (1) Whether 
the interrogations were isolated, lengthy, or involved threats and promises; 
and (2) Whether the defendant is mentally impaired or a juvenile, etc.202 
A promise of leniency is defined as any assurance given to a suspect that 
there will be a benefit to confessing.203 Although you may have seen a video 
of the interrogation, keep in mind that it is rare that an entire interrogation is 
recorded, and thus it may exclude an interrogator’s alleged promises.204 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 83–94 (remarking on the difficulty in dis-
counting confessions induced by promises of leniency); Kassin, supra note 15, at 228–29 (com-
menting on the general population’s inability to understand the coercive affects associated with 
promises of leniency); Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 234 (finding that people have a greater 
difficulty identifying implied, rather than express, promises of leniency); see also supra notes 70–
102 and accompanying text (explaining how confessions produced by promises of leniency ascer-
tain their strength from the public’s inability to detect, comprehend, and properly weigh such 
promises). 
 200 See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 240 (1941) (holding that the admission of an 
involuntary confession, but not an unreliable confession, in a criminal trial violates due process); 
Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 32, at 56 (noting that juries are expected, implicitly or explicit-
ly, to determine whether a confession was voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances). 
 201 See Kassin, supra note 35, at 114–15 (explaining personal and situational risk factors that 
heighten the risk of a false confession). 
 202 See id. (explaining the interrogation procedures and suspects that heighten the risk of a 
false confession). 
 203 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 13, at 917 (explaining promises of leniency). 
 204 See GARRETT, supra note 35, at 28 (finding that it is rare for an entire interrogation to be 
recorded); Garrett, supra note 14, at 1079 (finding that only 50% of exonerees’ confessions were 
recorded, and none of them were recorded in their entirety). Exoneree Jeffrey Deskovic was sub-
jected to several hours of interrogation throughout multiple sessions, but officers only used a re-
corder in one session, periodically turned it on and off, and ultimately only recorded 35 minutes. 
Garrett, supra note 14, at 1054–55. 
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A promise can be explicit, or implied.205 An explicit promise is defined 
as an outright guarantee by law enforcement of a certain favorable outcome 
such as “if you confess, we will drop the charges against your sister,” “your 
confession will allow me to tell the judge you cooperated,” or “in exchange 
for your confession, we will release you from this interrogation.”206 In con-
trast, an implied promise is defined as a subtler assertion by law enforce-
ment that there will be general benefits such as, “things will be better for 
you if you confess,” “confessing is a good idea,” or “if you confess, this 
process will be easier.”207 Because people often recall information beyond 
what was clearly said out loud, and instead process information “between 
the lines,” cognitive and linguistic research has found that express and im-
plied promises are equivalent in their coercive impact.208 
Both implied and express promises of leniency might lead a suspect to 
rationally conclude that a confession is in his best interest.209 First, research 
shows that suspects take officers’ promises of leniency seriously because 
they assume their interrogator has superior knowledge and experience con-
cerning the consequences of confessing.210 Second, rational choice theory 
studies demonstrate that suspects therefore rely on these promises in calcu-
lating whether it would be more beneficial to confess than maintain their 
innocence.211 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See Promise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/promise [https://perma.cc/M7KF-UWWY] (defining promise to include 
express and implied declarations that one will do something or refrain from doing something). 
 206 See Leo & Davis, supra note 32, at 35 (arguing suspects rely on interrogators’ explicit or 
implicit promise in deciding whether to confess); see, e.g., United States v. Li Xin Wu, 668 F.3d 
882, 886 (7th Cir. 2011) (declaring that a suspect of drug related offenses was not promised im-
munity, despite his claim to the contrary on appeal, because the suspect did not present any evi-
dence or move to exclude statements at trial); United States v. Montgomery, 555 F.3d 623, 629–
30 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that an officer did not promise a suspect accused of possession of a 
firearm as a felon that he would not receive a ten year sentence if he confessed because officer’s 
statements were intended to address suspect’s concerns that he would be tried on federal rather 
than state charges). 
 207 See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533 (Mass. 2004) (finding that an 
officer’s reference to a suspect’s need for counseling was an implicit promise that the interrogator 
would push for that outcome if the suspect confessed). 
 208 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 235, 248 (studying the impact of implied promises 
on suspects’ decision to falsely confess and finding implied and explicit promises are equally 
coercive). 
 209 See White, supra note 106, at 151 (explaining suspects’ rational choice to confess in re-
sponse to promises of leniency). 
 210 See Leo & Davis, supra note 32, at 9 (arguing that suspects give serious weight to an inter-
rogator’s arguments and implications that confessions will result in greater leniency). 
 211 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1001–77 (explaining that suspects become persuaded 
that resistance is either futile or not worth its costs). 
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The use of any single interrogation tactic or combination of tactics is 
not proof that the defendant falsely confessed.212 Instead, you should con-
sider promises of leniency as you assess all of the circumstances of the case, 
including all of the testimony and documentary evidence, in determining 
whether the defendant’s confession was reliable.213 Keep in mind that the 
defendant’s recitation of facts during the confession is not necessarily an 
indication of its reliability because those facts may be the product of an in-
terrogator’s intentional or accidental disclosures.”214 
C. The Proposed Jury Instruction in Practice: The Case of Calvin Ollins 
A jury instruction which used social science research to advise the jury 
about how to properly detect, comprehend, and weigh promises of leniency 
when deciding whether a confession is reliable may have prevented the jury 
from giving undue weight to Calvin Ollins’ confession.215 The first part of 
the instruction, designed to place promises within the larger framework of 
false confession science, would have alerted the jury that this promise inter-
acted with Calvin’s other situational and personal risk factors that elevated 
the probability that his confession was false.216 Particularly, their attention 
would have been drawn to his lengthy five hour long interrogation, the 
threats the officers made to smack him and impose the death penalty, his 
juvenile status as a fourteen-year-old, and his low IQ.217 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See Leo et al., supra note 68, at 517 (arguing that false confessions are ultimately a prod-
uct of unduly coercive techniques used by law enforcement and personal attributes that increase a 
suspect’s vulnerability to such pressure). 
 213 See Kassin, supra note 35, at 113–15 (listing interactive factors contributing to suspects’ 
vulnerability). 
 214 See Garrett, supra note 14, at 1053 (reviewing false confession testimony of DNA ex-
onerees and concluding that innocent suspects are informed of public and nonpublic facts of the 
crime). 
 215 See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 72, at 82–94 (remarking on the difficulty in dis-
counting confessions induced by promises of leniency); Kassin, supra note 150, at 228–29 (com-
menting on the general population’s inability to understand the coercive effects associated with 
promises of leniency); Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 234, 248 (finding that people have 
greater difficulty identifying implied, rather than express, promises of leniency); see also supra 
notes 70–102 and accompanying text (explaining how confessions produced by promises of leni-
ency ascertain their strength from the public’s inability to detect, comprehend, and properly weigh 
such promises); supra notes 201–214 and accompanying text (proposing a jury instruction to aid 
jurors to better detect, comprehend, and properly weigh promises of leniency when evaluating 
false confession testimony). 
 216 See Calvin Ollins, supra note 2 (providing factual background that led to Ollins’ wrongful 
conviction); see also supra notes 201–202 and accompanying text (providing jury instruction on 
personal and situational risk factors that heighten the risk of a false confession). 
 217 See Dellios, supra note 2 (reporting Calvin’s teachers testified that he was reading at the 
second grade level and that Calvin was interrogated for five hours before confessing); Possley & 
Mills, supra note 2 (reporting Calvin had an IQ between sixty-five and seventy); see also supra 
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The second part of the instruction, designed to enable juries to better 
detect both explicit and implicit promises of leniency, would have alerted 
them to the existence of the officer’s promise.218 At trial, Calvin testified 
that he confessed only after being told it would result in his release.219 The 
jury could have compared this to the definition of a promise of leniency as 
“any assurance that there will be a benefit to confessing,” as well as the 
numerous examples of promises, and concluded that a promise had in fact 
been made if they credited Calvin’s testimony.220 Regardless of whether the 
jury thought the promise was explicit or implicit, the instruction would have 
informed them that research has demonstrated that the two are functionally 
equivalent in terms of their coercive effect.221 
The third part of the instruction, designed to help the jury understand 
how promises of leniency can coerce a false confession, may have helped 
the jury realize that the officer’s promise, and not Calvin’s guilt, induced the 
confession we now know was false.222 Specifically, they would have real-
ized that Calvin took the promise that he could go home if he confessed 
seriously, even though it may have seemed ridiculous, because research 
shows suspects assume their interrogator has superior knowledge and expe-
rience concerning the consequences of confessing.223 In other words, the 
instruction would have indicated that Calvin was reasonable in relying on 
                                                                                                                           
notes 201–202 and accompanying text (explaining that a lengthy interrogation is a situational risk 
factor that can heighten the chance of a false confession). 
 218 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 235, 248 (studying the impact of implied promises 
and threats on suspects’ decision to falsely confess and juror’s verdicts); see also supra notes 203–
208 and accompanying text (proposing a jury instruction that explains how to detect and the coer-
cive effect of explicit and implicit promises). 
 219 See Dellios, supra note 2 (reporting on the circumstances surrounding Calvin’s convic-
tion). 
 220 See Good, supra note 112, at 915 (finding that Kansas treats the existence of a promise as 
a question of fact for the jury to decide); Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 235, 248 (explaining 
the ability of jurors to detect implied promises); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1060–77 (explain-
ing how an officer introduces promises of leniency in an interrogation and providing examples); 
see also supra notes 203–207 and accompanying text (proposing a jury instruction that explains 
how to detect and the coercive effect of explicit and implicit promises). 
 221 See Kassin & McNall, supra note 53, at 235, 248 (finding explicit and implied promises of 
leniency have same coercive effect); see also supra note 208 and accompanying text (proposing a 
jury instruction that explains explicit and implicit promises of leniency are functionally equiva-
lent). 
 222 See Leo & Davis, supra note 32, at 9 (arguing that suspects value an interrogator’s re-
marks that their confessions will result in greater leniency); White, supra note 106, at 151 (ex-
plaining the rational choice involved in confessing when promised leniency); see also supra notes 
209–213 and accompanying text (proposing a jury instruction that explains how promises of leni-
ency might lead a suspect to rationally conclude that a confession is in his best interest). 
 223 See Leo & Davis, supra note 32, at 9 (arguing suspects give serious weight to an interroga-
tor’s arguments and implications regarding why confessions will result in greater leniency); see 
also supra note 210 and accompanying text (proposing a jury instruction that explains why sus-
pects take officers’ promise of leniency seriously). 
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the promise when deciding whether it would be more beneficial to confess 
rather than maintain his innocence.224 Furthermore, the jury would have 
better understood that Calvin made the rational decision that confessing and 
being able to go home was more desirable than continuing to be subjected 
to a lengthy interrogation full of threats.225 
Lastly, the fourth part of the instruction would have reminded the jury to 
assess the reliability of Calvin’s confession in light of the other evidence pre-
sented at trial.226 If the jury had discounted Calvin’s confession, the only evi-
dence left at trial would have been Marcellus Bradford’s dubious incentivized 
testimony and the crime analyst’s problematic testimony about the vaginal 
swab test results.227 The jury may have questioned Bradford’s testimony be-
cause they heard that it was in exchange for a lighter sentence, and thus could 
infer he had an incentive to lie.228 Furthermore, Bradford stated that the mo-
tive for the robbery that ended in a brutal rape and murder was getting bus 
money for Calvin, which seems improbable.229 And even though the jury did 
not hear that the “secretor” test actually excluded Calvin, they did hear that it 
included thirty-seven percent of the male population, which certainly doesn’t 
seem to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.230 In sum, the 
proposed jury instruction could alert the jury to promises of leniency and pro-
vide the proper scientific research findings to aid them in understanding its 
coercive effect and weighing the confession in regards to its reliability.231 
                                                                                                                           
 224 See Leo & Davis, supra note 32, at 35 (arguing that suspects give serious weight to an 
interrogator’s arguments and implications regarding why confessions will result in greater lenien-
cy); supra note 210 and accompanying text (explaining why suspects take officers’ promises of 
leniency seriously). 
 225 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 53, at 1001–77, 1117 (explaining that suspects become per-
suaded that resistance is either futile or not worth its costs). 
 226 See Kassin, supra note 35, at 113–15 (listing the strategies officers use to overcome the 
resistance of a suspect as relevant factors); Leo et al., supra note 68, at 517 (listing the unduly 
coercive techniques used by law enforcement and personal attributes of the suspect as relevant 
factors); see also supra notes 212–214 and accompanying text (proposing jury instruction that 
informs jury they should consider promises of leniency when they assess all of the circumstances 
of the case). 
 227 See White, supra note 4, at 1022 (recounting the government’s case against Calvin at his 
first trial); Possley & Mills, supra note 2 (reciting evidence used at Calvin’s first trial). 
 228 See White, supra note 4, at 1022 (explaining the condition of Marcellus Bradford’s guilty 
plea). 
 229 See id. at 1023 (explaining the motive that Marcellus Bradford offered to explain the 
crime). 
 230 See People v. Ollins (Ollins I), 601 N.E.2d 922, 924 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (finding the tests 
performed on vaginal swabs, which included thirty-seven percent of the male population, were 
properly admitted at trial). 
 231 See generally Jones & Penrod, supra note 113 (finding research-based jury instructions on 
interrogation procedures minimize the risk of wrongful conviction in false confession cases). 
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CONCLUSION 
Although courts and scholars have long recognized the coerciveness of 
promises of leniency in the plea-bargaining context, the legal system has yet 
to acknowledge their effect in the interrogation context despite compelling 
similarities. Thus, defendants who plead guilty are afforded much greater 
procedural safeguards than suspects who confess. Considering emerging psy-
chological research, and the fact that DNA testing has exonerated almost 100 
convicts who have falsely confessed, it is becoming impossible to ignore that 
promises can induce innocent suspects to confess to crimes they did not 
commit. Such developments reveal the disarray among Federal Circuits in 
analyzing the admissibility of promise-induced confessions, and the disparity 
in safeguards is unfounded and must be addressed to prevent future wrongful 
convictions. A jury instruction could help close the gap by illuminating how 
promises of leniency can produce false confessions in ways that contradict 
jurors’ common understandings. The model instruction provided attempts to 
convey the relevant scientific and legal principles in a way that will impact 
jurors’ ability to detect, understand, and weigh promises of leniency in evalu-
ating the reliability of a confession. 
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